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CHAPTER 1. Introduction- object and purpose of public policy 
Globalisation and internationalisation of trade and economic constraints have led to more 
and more legal conflicts, with the parties subject to the dispute coming from different states 
and legal systems.  
More recently, developed methods of dispute resolution, like the non-binding methods of 
mediation and expert determination and the binding decisions from arbitrating tribunals, 
reduce the importance and take over the role of litigation of international legal disputes. 
However, the enforcement of final awards, whether received by litigation or arbitration, can 
only take place by means of, and support by, the power of courts of the enforcing state. They 
might not always agree with the decision of the arbitrators or the foreign judges or the judicial 
process in which the award seeking recognition and enforcement was made. According to 
the ILA, about ten per cent of all arbitral awards worldwide are denied recognition and/or 
enforcement due to various reasons1. Though those ten percent are not only denied 
recognition and enforcement due to an incoherence with public policy, public policy plays a 
role as a bar to enforcement which should not be underestimated, recalling the skeptical 
comment of the English judge who said almost two hundred years ago, when referring to 
public policy: ”It is never argued at all but where [all] other points fail.”2
But what is that thing called public policy? Indeed, it is difficult to define the term. According 
to the Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, public policy means: 
“In the context of policy-making, this phrase connotes the art of ruling wisely – implementing 
sound public policy. The phrase refers, rather vaguely, to matters regarded by the legislature 
or by the courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society.  
In the context of contract law, public policy connotes an overriding public interest that may 
justify a court’s decision to declare a contract void. In this context, too, the phrase is vague: 
“Public policy is a variable notion, depending on changing manners, morals [sic] and 
economic conditions. In theory, this flexibility of the doctrine of public policy could provide a 
judge with an excuse for invalidating any contract, which he violently disliked” (G.H. Treitel, 
The Law of Contract 424, 8th ed.1991)”.3
 
Public policy comes into consideration at three different stages of the dispute-resolving 
process. 
In the first stage, a court might not apply a certain legal system, a division thereof (e.g. 
                                                
1 Albert Jan van den Berg, International Arbitration Congress (17th : 2004 : Beijing, China) New 
horizons in international commercial arbitration and beyond / general editor: Albert Jan van den The 
Hague : Kluwer Law International, c2005. 2005 DH 341.522 NEW Page 287 
2 Bourrough J. in Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2.Bing. 229 at 252,[1824-34]All E.R.258 
3 Bryan A. Graner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, Second Edition, Oxford University Press 1995 
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commercial law, heritage law), nor a certain provision, where this would influence the 
outcome in a way that would be contrary to the public policy of the law of the state where the 
decision is made (lex fori )  
Secondly, public policy might be applied by an arbitrator or judge when making his decision 
on the merits of the case. This is less likely to happen in an arbitration process than in a 
litigation one, but it is possible because the parties involved in the arbitration are free to 
choose the law applicable to their dispute. 
Finally, public policy is considered when the award needs to be recognized and/or enforced4. 
The country, where the award is thought to be recognized and/or enforced5, usually is a state 
where the losing party has sufficient liquid assets6. Especially in international arbitration, this 
state is not identical with the state where the arbitration took place and whose law governed 
the arbitration procedure, since both parties usually wish to solve their dispute in a “neutral” 
state7; In other words, in a state to which none of the parties has any connection. To enforce 
an arbitral award, or any foreign domestic award, the courts of the state where enforcement 
is sought, firstly have to regard the award as valid and binding for the parties involved. There 
are numerous different multilateral and bilateral treaties and conventions between states 
regulating when and why recognition might be refused but even in the absence of such 
treaties, by using the international procedural laws (so called autonomic procedural laws), 
incompatibility with the public policy is always a reason to refuse enforcement. This applies 
unisono to arbitral awards and awards achieved by means of litigation. Any award contrary to 
4 Difference between recognition and enforcement: “Recognition on its own is generally a defensive 
process. It usually arises when a court is asked to guarantee a remedy in respect of a dispute that has 
been the subject of previous arbitral proceedings.(…) The award may have disposed of alle the issues 
raised in the new court proceedings, and so put an end to those new proceedings as res judicata, that 
is to say, as matters in issue between the parties which in fact have already been decided.(…) The 
legal force and effect of the foreign award will have been recognised, but the award itself  has not 
been enforced. 
(…)Enforcement goes a step further than recognition. A court that is prepared to grant enforcement of 
an award will do so because it recognises the award as validly made and binding upon the parties to it 
and, therefore suitable for enforcement. In this context, the terms recognition and enforcement do run 
together, one is the necessary part of the other.” Citied from Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 sections 
11 and 12.  
5 Unless otherwise expressively marked the terms recognition and enforcement do run together, one is 
the necessary part of the other. For further description see explanation of recognition and enforcement 
in the footnotes.    
6 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 section 07 
7 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 section 16 
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the public policy of the courts of the enforcing state will not be recognised. 
This principle of the public policy exception is enshrined in various international conventions, 
as in Article 5 II of the New York Convention or Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law8, and 
has long been grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. It is 
argued that the public policy exception to enforcement derives from each states` sovereignty 
and its right to exercise ultimate control over its legal system and monopoly of force and 
forms part of the jus cogens9 in international public law.10
Consequently, there is a tension which the courts and the legislature must resolve: On the 
one side the state does not want to enforce awards that contravene domestic laws, mores or 
public interests. On the other side, the state is bound by various conventions to enforce a 
final award, or at least risks negative diplomatic and economic consequences if it refuses the 
recognition of a foreign award without good reason. A restrictive enforcement policy would 
discourage market players to invest in cross-border investments, since they would face a 
high risk of not being able to execute awards in their favour. 
To summarize: in the short term, a state might profit from using the public policy exception to 
prevent enforcement of awards bearing diverse disadvantages for the state or its policy. In 
the long run, the frequent usage of this “exception” will prevent the development of similar 
law systems and transnational law limiting economic growth and international trade 
worldwide. 
Bearing in mind that the public policy exception is a natural right to every state, the question 
arises, whether public policy in the enforcement of foreign commercial awards constitutes a 
threatening curse for the winning party and international economy or a blessing for the state 
involved and the international systems that deal with conflict of law. 
After overseeing the whole picture, an attempt to answer the aforesaid question can be 
made. In the following chapters, this thesis will review the development of the concept of 
public policy as a restriction to the enforcement of international awards. Starting with an 
overview of all the various conventions, laws and court decisions referring to public policy, 
the thesis will seek a definition of public policy and show the actual content and scope of 
public policy as a bar to enforcement of foreign commercial awards.  
8 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, adopted by UNCITRAL on 21.06.1985  
9 Jus cogens is a synonym for customary law in international public law, in other words a law that has 
arisen out of a habit which was regular practice between states.  
10 ELGAR Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, edited by Jan M.Smits, published by Edward Elgar 
2006, -DHR-340.203-ELGA, Page 574-576 
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CHAPTER 2. Provisions of conventions, laws, awards and regulations on public policy 
The term “public policy” is one that is open to interpretation because it is not self-explanatory. 
As usual in law, it is the reserved right of the legislator to draft the legislation and to give the 
definitions of their terms in the laws. Only where terms are lacking a clear definition, there is 
space for the courts to fill the gap by giving a definition of their own. The definition itself has 
to consider the purpose and the content of the law. Therefore, it is necessary to start with a 
search for a definition of public policy in the most important international, regional and 
national legislative frameworks. 
 
2.1. Public policy in international conventions 
2.1.1. The Geneva treaties of 1923 and 1927 
The Geneva treaties are historically important as they form the fundament of conventions for 
the enforcement of arbitral awards on which the later New York Convention and the 
UNCITRAL model law are built upon11. The Geneva Protocol of 1923 had the objectives to 
make arbitration agreements enforceable internationally and to ensure that awards which 
underlie such arbitration agreements would be enforced in the territory of the state in which 
they were made. In other words: the Geneva Protocol of 1923 only provided enforcement for 
domestic protocol awards12. 
The Geneva Convention of 1927 went further, following the necessities of demand by 
international trade. It provided that an award would be recognized as binding and would be 
enforced in all member states, subject to certain conditions. One of these requirements was:  
 that the recognition or enforcement is not contrary to the public policy or to the principles of 
the law of the country in which it is sought to be relied upon.13
Unfortunately, the Geneva Convention of 1927 does not give a definition of public policy. 
However, it requires that the award shall not be contrary to “the principles of the law of the 
country in which it is sought to be relied upon”.14 By stating that an award would be open to 
attack on the grounds that it offended the legal principles of the forum state, the Convention 
                                                
11 Di Pietro, Domenico. Enforcement of international arbitration awards : the New York Convention of 
1958 / Domenico Di Piet London : Cameron May, 2001, Page 15 
12 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 section 21 
13 Geneva Protocol of 1927, Article 1 (e) 
14 See Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 section 22 
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implies that this is something different than public policy.   
2.1.2. New York Convention 1958 
The New York Convention (NYC) arose out of a preliminary Draft Convention on the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards prepared by the International Chamber of 
Commerce, after it became obvious that the system established by the Geneva Treaties of 
1923 and 1927 no longer met the requirements of international trade.15  
The NYC replaces the Geneva Convention of 1927 between states which are parties to both 
conventions.16 The purpose of the Convention is to standardize and simplify the recognition 
of international commercial arbitral awards to promote enforcement of such awards. 
Recognition might only be denied, subject to Article 5. The NYC does not permit any review 
on the merits of an award and the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement are 
exclusive. There are five separate grounds on which recognition and enforcement might be 
refused at the request of a party. The enforcing court itself has two grounds denying 
enforcement which may be invoked at the courts own discretion (ex officio)17. 
The first reason is an arbitration agreement regarded as invalid under the lex fori . The 
second reason is the award being contrary to public policy. 
The draft committee originally recommended a provision which referred to awards “clearly 
incompatible with public policy or with fundamental principles of law of the country in which 
the award was sought to be relied upon18”. This wording was not adopted in full length, but 
the drafting committee noted its intention in the report to “limit the application of the provision 
to cases in which recognition or enforcement would be distinctly contrary to the basic 
principles of the system of the country where the award is invoked”. 
Finally, the NYC Article 5 II b reads as follows: 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award also may be refused, if the competent 
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: 
a) (…) 
b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy of that 
country 
15 Schwebel, A celebration of the United Nations Convention, (1996) 12 Arbitration International 823 
16 New York Convention of 1958 Article 7 II 
17 Di Pietro, Domenico. Enforcement of international arbitration awards : the New York Convention of 
1958 / Domenico Di Piet London : Cameron May, 2001 Page 16/17 
18 Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, March 1955 UN Doc. 
E/2704 and E/AC 42/4/Rev. 1, see comments on Article 5.  
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In contrast to the Geneva treaties, Article 5 of the New York Convention only refers to public 
policy and not to the principles of the law of the country in which it is sought to be relied 
upon. However, the NYC does not give a definition of the meaning of public policy or 
attempts to harmonize public policy or establishing a common international standard19. 
2.1.3. UNCITRAL Model Law 
The UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 originates from an attempt to modernise the New York 
Convention. Believing that harmonisation of the enforcement practices of states, and the 
judicial control over the arbitration procedure, was to be achieved better by promulgation of a 
model or uniform law, the members of UNCITRAL drafted a model law instead of renewing 
the NYC. 
Public policy is mentioned in Article 34 as grounds for setting aside an arbitral award by the 
courts of the seat of arbitration, and in Article 36, as grounds for refusing recognition and 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.    
Serious discussions, during the drafting, concerning public policy in Article 34, arose 
between the United Kingdom delegation and the civil law delegations, regarding the scope of 
public policy. While the equivalent term ordre public in civil law also includes procedural 
irregularities, this is not necessarily the case under common law20. 
Finally, it was decided not to expand the list of the grounds for setting aside the award but 
the position was to be clarified in the Commission’s report as follows: 
“It was understood that the term “public policy” which was used in the 1958 New York 
Convention and many other treaties, covered fundamental principles of law and justice 
in substantive, as well as procedural respects. Thus, instances such as corruption, 
bribery and fraud and similar serious cases would constitute a ground for setting aside 
[the award]. It was noted, in that connection, that the wording “the award is in conflict 
with the public policy of the State” was not to be interpreted as excluding instances or 
events in relation to the manner in which it was arrived at.”21    
This clarification applying to the term public policy in Articles 34 and 36 can be seen as one 
of the first attempts, ever, to give a definition of the term in international conventions. Still the 
definition is pretty vague and leaves plenty room for “escape manoeuvres” by the enforcing 
courts of the member states. 
19 Interim ILA report on: Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards by 
Audley Sheppard, Arbitration International Vol.19 No.2 (2003) pp.217-248, Page221 
20 Borches, Commentary on the Uncitral Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer 
1990, page 190 ff 
21 United Nations Document A/40/17, Section 297 
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2.1.4. ICSID Washington Convention 1965: no reference to public policy 
The ICSID was founded by the Washington Convention of 1965, in order to have a special 
forum for international investment disputes and at the same time to promote foreign, direct, 
and indirect investment22. Today, the Washington Convention is in force in more than 140 
countries. Due to its nature as an investment dispute convention and its purpose to deal with 
disputes between an investor and a state, the Washington Convention does not expressly 
refer to public policy. However Article 52 sets out grounds for annulment of the award, which 
include corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal, serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure and giving an award without reasons. Unless an ICSID award 
is successfully challenged under ICSID `s own internal procedures, every contracting state 
must recognise and enforce an ICSID award like a final award of its own national courts.23
Enforcement of an ICSID award cannot be challenged in the courts of the enforcing country, 
neither on public policy grounds nor on grounds of sovereign immunity.24
 
2.2. Public policy in regional conventions 
2.2.1. The European Convention of 1961 
The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration was signed in Geneva on 
21 April 1961, designed to deal with problems of establishing and operating procedures for 
commercial disputes between (western and eastern) European countries25. Being more of a 
supplement to the New York Convention, it contains limitations upon the grounds of which an 
award covered by the Convention may be set aside by the courts of the issuing country. Any 
22 Di Pietro, Domenico. Enforcement of international arbitration awards : the New York Convention of 
1958 / Domenico Di Piet London : Cameron May, 2001 Page 17 
23 Journal of International Arbitration 23 (1):1-24, 2006 Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards Page 
4-18; Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10, section 55 
24 France, Cour de Cassation : public policy is not an issue to be considered by the judge when 
dealing with enforcement of ICSID awards.; from Journal of International Arbitration 23 (1):1-24, 2006 
Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards Page 8 and 9; (see also Carias-Borjas, “the Decision of the 
French Cour de Cassation in SOABI v. Senegal in 1991” American Review of International Arbitration 
354) 
25 Di Pietro, Domenico. Enforcement of international arbitration awards : the New York Convention of 
1958 / Domenico Di Piet London : Cameron May, 2001, Page 19 
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award set aside by reference to any other than these four grounds of the European 
Convention, which are quite similar to the first four grounds of the NYC, might still be 
recognised as a valid award and enforced in the courts of the member countries26. Though 
the European Convention of 1961 does not deal further with recognition and enforcement of 
awards and refers this issue to be dealt with in other treaties, it is interesting to see the 
intention to ban public policy treaty-wide as a reason for valid annulment of an award. 
Bearing in mind the situation in 1961 between western and eastern Europe during the times 
of the Cold War, it must have been a prior concern of the European states to preserve the 
finality of awards and their reliability against public policy issues. The emphasis, in those 
days,would have been on “policy”, rather than “public”, owing to the political climate.     
2.2.2. The Moscow Convention 
The Moscow Convention of 1972 originally applied to the Eastern European states forming 
part of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance27. With the recent developments in 
Europe, of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania having become 
members of the EU and having withdrawn their membership from the Moscow Convention; 
the Convention only applies to Cuba, Mongolia and Russia. 
The Convention states that arbitration awards shall be regarded as final and binding, and 
that the award may be enforced in the same way as final decisions made in the courts of the 
country of enforcement within two years after the rendering of the arbitral award. The only 
grounds for refusal of enforcement are lack of jurisdiction, denial of fair hearing and the 
award having been set aside.28 Public policy is not mentioned expressly in this convention, 
but possibly the grounds for refusal of enforcement form public policy.29
2.2.3. Panama Convention 1975: ”public policy of that state” 
The Panama Convention of 1975 is an Inter South American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration and was signed by 12 South American states. The Panama 
Convention, strongly inspired by the NYC, represents a remarkable step away from the 
former hostility towards international arbitration, as reflected in the Calvo Doctrine30. 
26 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10, section 56 
27 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 section 57 
28 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 section 57 
29 Di Pietro, Domenico. Enforcement of international arbitration awards : the New York Convention of 
1958 / Domenico Di Piet London : Cameron May, 2001, Page 18 
30 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 section 58 
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Under the Panama Convention, an arbitral decision or award that is not appealable under the 
applicable law or procedural rules shall have the force of a final judicial judgement. Its 
execution (enforcement) or recognition shall be ordered in the same manner as that of 
decisions of national or foreign ordinary courts. Recognition and execution of an award may 
be refused on the motion of the court only; that is, if Article 5 II applies, stating: 
(a) That the subject matter of the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration under the law of 
that State, or 
(b) That recognition or execution of the decision would be contrary to the public policy 
(“ordre public”) of that State.31 
Unfortunately, the Panama Convention does not provide a definition of the term “public 
policy” or “ordre public”. 
 
2.2.4. OHADA Uniform ACT 
L`Organisation pour l `Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires was created in 1993, to 
make commercial laws in Africa uniform. OHADA is open to member states of the 
Organization of African Unity, and to date 16 states32 have joined. 
In 1999, a uniform arbitration law was adopted, which provides, in Article 31, that recognition 
and enforcement shall be refused if the award is manifestly contrary to a rule of international 
public policy of the member states. The system is supervised and interpreted by a special 
court in Abidjan (Côte d`Ivoire), to which appeal against decisions of the courts of 
enforcement is permitted. This uniform arbitration law is said to be the first attempt to 
harmonise public policy within several sovereign states33.  
Although Article 26 of the Uniform Act on Arbitration of the OHADA refers to a public policy 
exception, it does not give a definition of the public policy of its members. Since Article 32 of 
the Act provides the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration as the supreme body, it 
appears as if this Common Court would also have the jurisdiction to review public policy 
considerations of its Member States. In time, the Common Court will establish a definition of 
the applied public policy for the enforcement of arbitral awards in the OHADA Member 
States.  
31 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 section 58 
32 Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Côte d`Ivore, Congo, Camores, 
Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equitorial-Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
33 www.refer.org/camer_ct/eco/ecohada/ohada.html visited on the 10.01.2007 
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2.2.5. Other Conventions 
The Montevideo Convention of 1979 requires, in Article 2 (h), that an award is “manifestly 
contrary to the principles and laws of the public policy [“orden publico”] of the exequatur 
state”, but once again, lacks a definition of public policy. 
The Riyad Convention of 1983, applying to mainly Arab states, refuses recognition according 
to Article 37 if the award is “contrary to the Muslim Shari`a, public policy or good morals of 
the signatory State where enforcement is sought”.34 Though there is no definition of the term 
“pubic policy” in the convention, it is possible to conclude that public policy is something 
different than the Shari`a or good morals, since all three terms are listed after each other, 
indicating that they are terms of various meanings.  
However, the later Amman Convention of 1987, open to membership by the Arab states, 
refers simply to “public policy” thereby renders any aforesaid interpretation of the term public 
policy obsolete in the Riyad Convention35. Though the Amman Convention is modelled on 
the Washington Convention, it is of limited international interest because it restricts 
submissions and pleadings to the Arabic language and the proceedings that it contemplates 
are thus not accessible to most parties to international commercial agreements36. 
The European Community Treaty is said to have some indirect influence on public policy by 
forcing the member states to interpret public policy in a way that is not contrary to the 
essential regulations of the Treaty. However, this point of view is very controversial as 
discussed in the literature, and, so far, there is no consent but that public policy or (ordre 
public) is, nowhere in the convention, referred to expressly. 
After checking the international and regional conventions on enforcement, it may be 
concluded, that the UNCITRAL Model Law report is the only one that tries to give a vague 
idea of what could be meant by the term “public policy”. Though there are some aspects that 
work well for a negative definition of the term, where reference is made to public policy and 
something else, it is possible to conclude that the “something else” is not part of public policy. 
34 Convention of the Arab league on Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, made in Amman, 14.April 1987. 
This Convention has not come into force, because it has not been ratified by the stipulated minimum 
of seven Arabic states. (See the Interim ILA report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards by Audley Sheppard, Arbitration International Vol.19 No.2 (2003) pp.217-
248, Page 224) 
35 Di Pietro, Domenico. Enforcement of international arbitration awards : the New York Convention of 
1958 / Domenico Di Piet London : Cameron May, 2001, Page 19 
36 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 10 Section 60 
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According to this line of reasoning, good morals, the Muslim Shari`a and the principles of the 
law of the country in which the award is sought to be relied upon would not be included in the 
term “public policy”. But this result would strongly neglect the content of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law report and the various conventions, which refer simply to public policy. There is 
no convincing positive or negative definition in international and regional conventions. 
Consequently, the next step is to check the various national legislations to see whether they 
offer a definition of public policy. 
2.3. Public policy in national legislations 
2.3.1. National Legislation 
The various national legislations use different terms when referring to public policy. Some 
expressly refer to “international public policy, while others refer to “national norms”. 
The French legislation makes reference to the “ordre public international”37, which means the 
same as the international public policy stipulated in the legislation of Algeria, Lebanon and 
Portugal38. Quite similarly, Romanian and Tunisian legislation refers to the “public policy as 
understood in private international law”39. Most national laws, like the German law (ordre 
public), refer simply to “public policy”, which is similar to the wording of the New York 
Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law.40  
Other countries like Japan, Libya, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates refuse 
recognition of awards which are contrary to public policy and good morals. Yemen even 
refuses enforcement of awards contrary to the Muslim Shari`a.41
China refers to public policy, too, but refuses enforcement of any enemy states as part of 
public policy, such as Taiwan.42
37 Article 1502 of Title 5 of, Code de Procedure Civil (French Civil Procedure Act) 
38Portugal Article 1096 (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure; Algeria 458 bis 23(h) of Decree No. 83.09, 
Lebanon  Article 817 (5) of Decree- law no 90;  
Citied from Page 224 of the Interim ILA report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards by Audley Sheppard, Arbitration International Vol.19 No.2 (2003) pp.217-
248 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 ibid 
42 Hakansson Cecilia, Commercial Arbitration under Chinese Law, Iustus Foerlag Uppsala 1999, Page 
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Finally, some countries do not refer to public policy explicitly. Austrian Law separates 
mandatory rules (zwingendes Recht) and the “basic principles of the Austrian legal system”. 
(wesentliche Grundzüge des österreichischen Rechts).43 The Swedish courts refuse 
enforcement of a foreign award, “if it would be clearly incompatible with the basic notions of 
the Swedish legal system to enforce the award”. Under Polish Law, awards which “offend the 
legality or the principles of social coexistence in the Polish People `s Republic” are not 
enforceable.  The Republic of Korea requires a foreign judgement to fulfil the “good morals 
and the social order of the Republic of Korea”, whereas China refuses enforcement of  
foreign awards only “if it goes against social and public interest”.44  
A very restrictive approach, that might still be a leftover of the Calvo-doctrine, is to be found 
in Brazil, which refuses enforcement if “the decision is offensive to national public policy”. 
2.3.2. Approach of the Courts 
Public policy has been applied by the Courts for a long time, and consequently there are  
some definitions to be found. 
In the English case, Egerton v. Brownlow in 1853, the following definition was found by the 
court:  
“Public policy (…) is that principle of law, which holds that no subject can lawfully do that 
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good”45 . 
In this definition of the principle, it is noteworthy that a tendency to harm the public is enough 
to refuse the enforcement. Later definitions have stronger requirements. The Australian 
Jacob Morris stated in his extensive definition of public policy that: 
 
“the phrase public policy appears to mean the ideas which, for the time being, prevail in a 
207-208 
43 Article 595 (1).6 of the “Östereichische Zivilprozessordnung” (Austrian Code of Zivil Procedure) 
44 Interim ILA report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards by 
Audley Sheppard, Arbitration International Vol.19 No.2 (2003) Page 224f,  referring to 
Sweden: Section 55(2) of the Swedish Arbitration Act 1999 
Poland: Article 712 (1)(4), 1146 and 1150 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1964 
Korea: Article 203 of Chapter 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1991 
China: Article 260 of Chapter 28 of the Law of Civil Procedure 1991  
45 England: Egerton v. Brwonlow (1853) 4 HLC 1 
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community as to the conditions necessary to ensure its welfare, so that anything is treated as 
against public policy if it is generally regarded as injurious to the public interest (…). It is well 
settled, that a contract is not enforceable if its enforcement would be opposed to public policy 
(…). Public policy is not, however, fixed and stable. From generation to generation ideas 
change as to what is necessary or injurious, so that public policy is a variable thing46". 
 
In the Deutsche Schacht und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH. vs. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil 
Company, the English Court found that public policy was violated, when “there is some 
element of illegality or that the enforcement would be clearly injurious to the public good, or 
possibly, that enforcement would be wholly offensive to the ordinary, reasonable and fully 
informed member of the public on whose behalf the powers of the state are exercised.”47
This more recent definition requires illegality or certain harm (clearly injurious) to public 
goods and when looking at other court decisions, it can be concluded that the trend goes 
towards a restrictive application of public policy with high requirements. The Hong Kong 
Court of Final Appeal in 1999  stated “that for refusement of an arbitral award under the New 
York Convention on public policy grounds, the award must be so fundamentally offensive to 
that jurisdiction`s notion of justice that, despite it being a party to the Convention, it cannot 
reasonably be expected to overlook the objection”48.   
The German Bundesgerichtshof defines public policy very restrictively as a violation of 
essential principles of German law (ordre public) (...) which is basic to public or commercial 
life or (…) contradicts the German idea of justice in a fundamental way. A mere violation of 
the procedural law applied by the arbitral tribunal is not sufficient to constitute such a 
violation.49
The Swiss Supreme Court, in 1994 concluded, that a decision violates public policy only if it 
violates fundamental legal principles to the extent that it is irreconcilable with the legal order 
and the applicable value system.50 The United States applies a restrictive concept of the 
public policy exception. In Prasons&Whitemore51, Judge Smith decided that enforcement of 
46 Australia: Re Jacob Morris (deceased) (1943) N.S.W.S.R. 352 
47 England :Deutsche Schachtbau und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil 
Company (1987) 2 Loyd`s Rep 246,254 
48 Hebei Import and Export Corporation vs. Ploytek Engineering Co. Ltd (1999) 2 HKC 205; reported in 
XXIV Yearbook 652 
49 BGH 12/07/1990 III ZR174/89, NJW 1990 page 3210 
50 Swiss Supreme Court 30.Dec.1994 YCA [Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration] XXI (1996) 
51 Parsons&Whitemore Overseas Co. Inc vs. Societe General de l`industrie du Papier RAKTA and 
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the foreign award should only be denied where enforcement would violate the forum state’s 
most basic notions of morality and justice.  
Moreover, in 1974, the US Supreme Court recognized the difference between domestic and 
international public policy, by enforcing an agreement to arbitrate a claim in the context of 
international trade, which would have been restricted from arbitration if it were to arise from a 
domestic transaction.52  
A similar concept is used in various states today. The European civil law countries of 
Germany, Italy, Switzerland and France, expressly apply international public policy when 
considering enforcement of foreign awards. Argentina, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain and Sweden apply public policy in international matters restrictively with a similar 
intention 53. 
Bearing in mind the first definition of public policy, it becomes obvious that the term public 
policy becomes more complex over the years and has been divided into at least two different 
terms of international and national public policy. 
This approach to differentiation, expressly or by application, between the ordre public interne 
and the ordre public externe, follows the need of respect to the finality of awards when 
considering an objection to enforcement on certain grounds (of illegality) and effectively 
endorses a restrictive concept of public policy. 
2.4. Conclusion of Chapter 2 
Since none of the above cited legislations contain a definition of the term public policy, it 
might be concluded that there is no such definition for the following reason: the legislator 
does not want to define the term in order to increase the term “public policy”`s flexibility and 
use by the judiciary  to argue with public policy :”where [all] other points fail.”54
By necessity, the Courts, unlike the legislator, developed definitions of public policy. 
However, the judiciary itself usually is more or less strictly bound to reference cases, but 
there can always be a new reference case. 
It is noteworthy that, although, these laws give an idea of what is meant by the term public 
policy, none of them gives an exact definition of it and even if there were a definition by one 
Bank of America 508 F.2d 969 (2nd Cir.1974) 
52 ILA 226, see also Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States (Kluwer, 1994) 
pp.527-545 
53 ILA Page 225 
54 Bourrough J. in Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2.Bing. 229 at 252,[1824-34]All E.R.258  
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domestic law, this would not apply to the meaning of the same term in other states. However, 
one uniformity has become visible among the various legal definitions: there seems to be a 
difference in most states between the public policy which is applied to domestic awards 
(national public policy) and the one which is used for the recognition of foreign awards 
(international public policy). 
 
CHAPTER 3. Seeking a uniform definition of public policy 
3.1. General 
After we found out that there are extant definitions of “public policy” used by the various 
national courts, there might be such a thing as a uniform definition of public policy, or at least 
a uniform definition of the essence of public policy. 
As seen above, it is hardly possible, if not impossible, to find such a thing as a worldwide 
uniform definition of the content of public policy. The various legal systems defend different 
economic, legal, moral, political, religious and social values at all costs and without 
exception. Therefore, it seems to be appropriate to focus on the concepts of public policy that 
are used in non-domestic awards. These concepts of international and transnational public 
policy and their applications have to be described, before having a closer look at the 
meaning of international public policy. 
3.2. The concept of international public policy 
The cited court decisions differentiate between public policy and international public policy. 
Also in the legislation, reference is made, for example, to “ordre public international”55. This 
implies that international public policy is something different than domestic public policy. 
Under German law, a distinction between public policy and international public policy is made 
by referring to the term “ordre public” which is used as a synonym for international public 
policy in German law56. The Court of Appeal of Milan has held that the public policy referred 
to in Article 5 II (b) of the New York Convention is the international public policy and not the 
domestic public policy of Italy57.  
                                                
55 French Code of Civil Procedure 
56 Prof. Andrae Lehrstuhl für Bürgerliches Recht, Internationales Privat- und Verfahrensrecht sowie 
Rechtsvergleichung, Script „Anerkennung und vollsteckung auslaendischer Entscheidungen’ 
http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/lsandrae/vorlesung.html“ 
57ILA Page 219 
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International public policy is said to have a narrower scope than domestic public policy. 
International public policy, according to a generally accepted doctrine, is confined to violation 
of extremely fundamental conceptions of legal order in the country concerned.58 Not every 
rule of law that is part of the domestic public policy necessarily forms part of the international 
public policy. However, there are some regulations that are only concerned with the 
international public policy, such as mandatory export regulations, etc., which cannot be 
violated in domestic trade but only in international trade. 
A typical example would be the case of “Messageries Maritimes”, ruled by the Court of 
Cassation of France on 21 June 195059: 
The case was based on a loan of Canadian gold dollars by the French company 
“Messageries Maritimes”, which tried to repay its bond holders in paper dollars, in 
accordance with a Canadian statute that came into beeing after the date of the loan; this 
statute had inherently devalued the dollar and prohibited gold clauses without discriminating 
between internal and international payments. The Court of Cassation ignored the Canadian 
statute and declared, in a now famous anouncement, that the parties to such a contract were 
entitled to agree, even against the mandatory rules of a municipal law governing their 
contract, a gold value clause valid under a French law of 25 June 1928 in accordance with 
the French concept of international public policy. 
This case demonstrates that the idea of public policy allowed the creation of a rule (of 
“substantive” private international law) specific to international payments and different from 
the rule of French law applicable to domestic payments. This new rule was that of the validity 
of gold clauses in international contracts. According to Dean Lerebours-Pigeonnière, the 
case is based upon a public policy  
“which does not underlie the particularism of French domestic life and, quite to the contrary, 
is based on the desire that private transfrontier relations be governed by an international 
legal order (...) the exception of public policy leads here to the creation within French 
domestic law of a kind of ius gentium parallel to the domestic common law”60.  
Nevertheless, one could argue that international public policy still forms part of the public 
policy of that state, but is not necessarily applied in domestic cases. 
58 Professor Sanders in ILA Page 219 
59 Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, ICCA Congress 
series no. 3 (New York/1986), pp. 258 – 318; Kluwer Law International Section 54 
60 Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, ICCA Congress 
series no. 3 (New York/1986), pp. 258 – 318; Kluwer Law International Section 55 
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The distinction between public policy and international public policy brings with it that awards 
are rarely refused enforcement on grounds of (international) public policy. 
3.3. Transnational public policy 
3.3.1. Transnational public policy and foreign public policy 
Transnational or truly international public policy is even narrower in its concept than 
international public policy. It is called transnational public policy, because it implies those 
rules which are so essential that they are to be found in the international public policy of a 
number of states. They are, so to speak, of universal application, forming part of natural law 
as principles of universal justice, peremptory in public international law being general 
principles of morality accepted among the “civilized nations”.61 Corruption, drug trafficking, 
smuggling and terrorism, are only some activities that would certainly contravene the moral 
or the legal principles of all those nations62   
However, it is very hard in practice to differentiate between transnational public policy and 
the phenomenon of an application of the international public policy of another state than the 
lex fori  Sate. According to a basic notion of international private law, the essential validity of 
a contract depends on only one law which governs the whole contract, the so-called proper 
law- or lex contractus. The quasi-universal recognition of the principle of autonomy of the will, 
on the one hand, and the traditional conception of international public policy of the forum 
(assumed to aim solely at the protection of the fundamental principles of the lex fori ), on the 
other hand, lead to a logical consequence: the violation of foreign rules (foreign to the lex 
contractus and to the lex fori ) will, in general, not be sanctioned at all. Where public policy 
concerns of a state, different from the forum state, are applied, this phenomenon of solidarity 
is an application of “comity” in the traditional sense of the great Dutch Statutists or of Joseph 
Story, or an example of what Savigny called the “freundliche Zulassung”, i.e. of a factor 
aimed at correcting the rigidity of the territoriality of private international law63. 
A leading case, in this respect, is the decision Regazonni v. KC Senthia Ltd., decided in 1958 
by the House of Lords. In an international contract, perfectly in order with regard to the 
61  Buchannan, Public Policy in International Commercial Arbitration, 26 American Business Law 
Journal (1988) Page 511.  
62 Ila Page 220 
63 1986 A.C. 301; [1957] 3 All E.R. 286, J.1961. 1140,  
from ICCA Congress series no. 3 (New York/1986) , Transnational (or Truly International) Public 
Policy and International Aritration, pp 258-318, Page 278 section 72 
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English “proper law”, between two businessman of which one was domiciled in England and 
the other in Switzerland, the English Court considered the contract null and void according to 
Indian law, which prohibited the trade of jute with South Africa, following the apartheid 
measures imposed on Indians.64  
It is very difficult to foresee the application of such foreign public policies by the courts of 
enforcement and there is only a handful of decisions where public policies foreign to the 
proper law of the contract and to the lex fori  have been applied. They are, so to speak only a 
friendly gesture towards a friendly state.  
Nevertheless, it is easier to differentiate between the application of foreign international 
public policy and transnational public policy, when looking at them from a technical point of 
view. A transnational public policy has to be agreed upon between several states65. Often, 
there will be a multilateral treaty or international convention between the states. Regarding 
e.g. the trade of arms, there is the International Convention of the 17.June 1925 concluded 
under the auspices of the League of Nations on the repression of arms traffic.  
Another more recent example might be the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention), which is open to 
membership by any state fighting against money laundering. 
The targeted goals of these conventions, subject to the measures that are considered in the 
conventions to reach these goals, form part of the public policy of each member state to the 
convention. The main characteristic of the transnational public policy is the uniform 
application of a certain policy in several states in contrast to the application of a foreign 
international public policy doctrine in one state.  
If there is no convention, then there might be an established practice between the states to 
refuse the enforcement of awards due to certain grounds. The same (international) public 
policy applied in like situations is nothing else but transnational public policy. 
64 1986 A.C. 301; [1957] 3 All E.R. 286, J.1961. 1140, from ICCA Congress series no. 3 (New 
York/1986) , Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration, pp 258-
318, Page 278 section 73 
65 If the agreement was only between to states it would not be called transnational public policy but 
binational public policy 
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3.3.2. European Community treaty 
3.3.2.1. Some starting remarks 
A particularly interesting example of transnational public policy is the development of a 
European public policy66. In the European Union, the member states are not united, like the 
United States for example, but nevertheless, there is some European legislation on certain 
issues. 
It is surprising that it was only on the 1 of June 1999, that the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) rendered its first decision expressly mentioning European public policy in the Eco-
Swiss67 case, stating that Article 81 of the ECT is part of European public policy. This 
statement of recognition, regarding the existence of a trans-European public policy, raises a 
number of further questions. The concept of European public policy, supremacy and uniform 
application of European law, its direct effect on the law of the European states, its content 
and the extent of the review of the award are the questions under consideration.   
3.3.2.2. The Concept of European Public policy 
The EC Treaty does not contain any direct reference to public policy. However, an indirect 
reference can be found in Article 65 of the ECT, which mentions as one of the measures in 
                                                
66 Shelkoplyas, Natalya. The application of EC law in arbitration proceedings / Natalya Shelkoplyas. 
Groningen : Europa Law Pub., 2003. 2003 DH 341.754 SHEL Page 174-178 
67 ECJ C-126/77, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. vs. Benetton International NV, 9 Mealey`s International 
Arbitration Report 1999, page 639, Further states:  
“The Case was about the following: In 1986 Benetton concluded an eight-year licensing agreement 
with Eco Swiss (Hong Kong) and Bulova (New York). Under this agreement Benetton guaranteed Eco 
Swiss the right to manufacture watches and clocks bearing the words “Benetton by Bulova”, which 
could then be sold by Eco Swiss and Bulova. All disputes arising out of the agreement were to be 
submitted to arbitration in conformity with the rules of the Netherlands Institute of Arbitration. The 
arbitral tribunal was to apply Netherlands law. No notification regarding the agreement had been filed 
with the European Commission and the agreement did not fall under a Block Exemption. Benetton 
gave notice of termination effective as of 24 September 1991 about three Years before the end of the 
fixed term, whereupon Eco Swiss and Bulova initiated arbitration proceedings against Benetton. In a 
partial award the arbitral tribunal decided that Benetton should compensate Eco Swiss and Bulova for 
the damage suffered due to the premature termination of the agreement. When the parties were 
unable to come to an agreement, the arbitrators made a final award. After various defence tactics the 
ECJ finally came to his decision recommending the enforcement of the award.”  
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the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters “improving and simplifying (…) the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases, including decisions in 
extrajudicial cases”. Various treaties, such as the Treaty of Rome, the NYC and the Brussels 
Conventions, regarding the enforcement of awards are ratified by all European states. All 
these treaties acknowledge the principle of the public policy exception68.  
Where court decisions of the member states decide on grounds of public policy, they leave 
the question open if this is their lex fori  international public policy or European transnational 
public policy. Starting in 1969, the German Supreme Court held that the EC law belongs to 
German public policy to the extent that it establishes the foundations of the Common Market 
and is not just concerned with the expedient organization of affairs69. The Austrian Supreme 
Court found in 1998 that the fundamental principles, like those of the internal market, have to 
be taken into account when considering the violation of public policy. The court held that this 
results from the principle of priority of the European Community law.70
The ECJ itself refers to a concept of European public policy. There are two decisions of the 
ECJ that draw particular attention to this problem. 
In the Nordsee71 case, the ECJ found, that: 
“(…) if questions of [European] Community law are raised in an arbitration resorted to by 
agreement, the ordinary courts may be called upon to examine them either in the context of 
their collaboration with arbitration tribunals, in particular, in order to assist them in certain 
procedural matters or to interpret the law applicable, or in the course of a review of an 
arbitration award – which may be more or less extensive depending on the circumstances - 
and which may be required to effect in case of an appeal of objection, in proceedings for 
leave to issue the execution or by any other method of recourse available under the relevant 
national legislation.” 
In Eco Swiss,72 the ECJ held, that: 
68 Shelkoplyas, Natalya. The application of EC law in arbitration proceedings / Natalya Shelkoplyas. 
Groningen : Europa Law Pub., 2003. 2003 DH 341.754 SHEL Page 174-178 
69 BGH 27/02/1969 NJW 1969 page 978 
70 OHG 23/02/1998 from “The healthy Award” Christoph Liebscher Page 27 
71 ECJ 102/81 Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei 
AG&Co.KG [1982] ECR 1095 at para.455 
72 ECJ C126/77 ECO Swiss China Time Ltd.vs.Benetton International NV, 9 Mealey `s International 
Arbitration Report 1999, Page 639 
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“it is in the interest of efficient arbitration proceedings that review of arbitration awards should 
be limited in scope and that annulment of, or refusal to, recognise an award should be 
possible only in exceptional circumstances (…). However, according to Article 3 (1)(g) of the 
EC Treaty, Article 81 of the  EC treaty constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential 
for the functioning of the internal accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community 
and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market. The importance of such a 
provision led the framers of the Treaty to provide expressly, in Article 81 (2) EC that any 
agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to that Article are to be automatically void (…). 
The provisions of Article 81 may be regarded as a matter of public policy (…).73
There is an increasing number of supporting voices for this idea found in literature. Mustilll 
and Boyd74, to mention just two of them, state that “it appears that any point of EC law which 
is in the realm of public policy or ordre public may be raised by way of defence to 
proceedings to enforce the award.”75   
From the decisions of the national Courts, the two ECJ decisions and the literature, it can be 
concluded that there are provisions of European law which do belong to public policy. As 
seen above, it is held that the public policy exception only applies if fundamental principles of 
the legal system are violated, but when is it the case with European public policy? Is the 
public policy exception, because of the effet utile, to be raised every time European law is 
violated. In other words, is all European law fundamental? And, if there is a differentiation, 
which principles are fundamental and which ones are not? Therefore, the question arises as 
to which provisions of the European law form part of this trans-European public policy. 
3.3.2.3. Supremacy and Uniform Application 
The principle of supremacy holds that in case of a conflict between directly effective EC law 
and the national law of a Member State, the EC law has priority. While Dr. Christoph 
Liebscher76 strongly promotes this principle and states that it has been argued that, as a 
consequence of the principle of supremacy, all rules of EC law which have direct effect are 
                                                
73ECJ C126/77 ECO Swiss China Time Ltd.vs.Benetton International NV, 9 Mealey `s International 
Arbitration Report 1999, Page 639ff at paragraph 35 and following 
74 Sir Michael J. Mustill and Stewart C. Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in 
England, 2nd edition Butterworths, London and Edinburgh, 1989, Page 74ff 
75 Christoph Liebscher, European Public Policy- a black box? Journal of International Arbitration. Vol. 
17 No 3 (2000) pp 73- 88, Page 76 
76 Christoph Liebscher, European Public Policy- a black box? Journal of International Arbitration. Vol. 
17 No 3 (2000) pp 73- 88, Page 76 
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part of public policy. Other, mainly German, experts77 doubt the limitless principle of 
supremacy. They build their argument on the technical aspect of how European Law is 
created. 
Since the European Union does not have a constitution of its own, it legally only posses the 
power to make laws concerned with issues which the member states have empowered the 
European Union to do so. This is called the principle of the beschränkte Einzelermächtigung 
(limited empowerment). Every topic on which the EU wants to rule with legal provisions first 
has to be permitted to it, usually by a law in every member state. This law, transmitting the 
capacity to rule on a certain topic, has to be in accordance with the constitution of the giving 
state. If it is against the constitution, it might be found null and void and, consequently, the 
EU law lacks its foundations. Furthermore, because the transmitting law only is a simple law, 
the EU law cannot be something better than the transmitting law. Consequently, every 
Member State`s constitution has priority above all European Law. 
Congruency might be found between those two schools of thoughts, in so far as that 
European Law has priority when in conflict with simple national Laws78, to safeguard the 
uniform application of EC law throughout the Community. 
The principle of uniform application of the law is a basic rule of national legal systems. In Eco 
Swiss, the ECJ referred to the principle of uniform application as follows: 
“ it is manifestly in the interest of the community legal order that, in order to forestall 
differences of interpretation, every Community provision should be given a uniform 
interpretation, irrespective of the circumstances in which it is to be applied (…) it follows that, 
in the circumstances of the present case (…) community law requires that questions 
concerning interpretation of the prohibition laid down in Article 81 (1) EC (…) should be open 
to examination by national courts when asked to determine the validity of an arbitration 
award and that it should be possible for those questions to be referred, if necessary, to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.79” 
It should be noted, that the ECJ first establishes the fundamental nature of Article 81 (1) of 
the ECT and afterwards refers to uniform application. Uniform application and supremacy 
alone, which is not even mentioned, is not seen by the ECJ to be a sufficient criterion alone. 
77 Zoe Honegger, Universität Freibung U.i.e., Die unmittelbare Wirkung der Grundfreiheiten, Basics 
www.Universitaet-Freibung.de follow the links to the publications about European public law. 
78 Law that is of lower rank than the constitution 
79 ECJ C126/77 ECO Swiss China Time Ltd.vs.Benetton International NV, 9 Mealey `s International 
Arbitration Report 1999, Page 639af at paragraph 40 
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3.3.2.4. Direct Effect and Indirect Effect 
There are provisions with direct effect and provisions without direct effect in the Member 
States in European Law.  
Direct effect means that these rules create rights or obligations without further steps to be 
taken by the member states. According to Liebscher80, provisions of primary law. or of a 
regulation, have direct effect, if:  
-the content of the rights or obligations is clear and precisely formulated 
-the provision is unconditional and unqualified and 
-the institutions of the EC or the Member States are not allowed any margin of discretion if 
implementing measures are necessary. 
According to Liebscher, it has been argued that all provisions of EC law with direct effect 
pertain to public policy. 
From the definition of transnational public policy as a policy that has the same content 
among several states, this approach might be convincing. However, these direct effect public 
policy rules only would constitute a part of the real trans-European public policy, since some 
of the indirect rules would be uniform in content and application among the member states 
and therefore would be transnational public policy, too81. 
The theory that all provisions of EC law with direct effect pertain to public policy, appears to 
be wrong, when considering that direct effect derives from the clear and precise wording and 
not from the content of the regulation. In the European Union, directives leave matters of 
great importance to the Member States, it would be strange, if direct effect would be the 
criteria to detect trans-European public policy. Furthermore, many regulations of European 
primary law have direct effect, but little relevance except for organisational issues. Why 
should they constitute part of trans-European public policy? Finally, it has to be mentioned, 
that the ECJ does not follow this theory, otherwise it could have simply referred to the direct 
effect of Article 81. Instead the ECJ pointed out the fundamentality and the importance of 
Article 81. 
In its judgement, the ECJ bases the argument of Article 81 ´s fundamentality in the context of 
                                                
80 Christoph Liebscher, the Healthy Award, Page 39 af 
81 Shelkoplyas, Natalya. The application of EC law in arbitration proceedings / Natalya Shelkoplyas. 
Groningen : Europa Law Pub., 2003. 2003 DH 341.754 SHEL Page 179 
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EC law on Article. 3 (1) g and Article 81 (2) ECT.  Article 3 only promotes the protection of 
competition. Consequently, all European laws which are affecting competition somehow 
could be founded on the exceedingly wide goal proscribed by Article 3. This does not really 
appear to be a strong argument for fundamentality. Article 81 (2) declares agreements or 
decisions contrary to Article 81 (1) automatically void82. Together with the concept and the 
history of the European Union, favouring one big market within the borders of the union, the 
importance of competition and its fundamental role becomes clear.  
The ECJ decision indicates that the borderline between provisions that belong to trans-
European public policy is the principle of fundamentality. 
3.3.2.5. Review of the Awards in Practice 
3.3.2.5.1. General Considerations 
Every trans-European public policy only can be applied, if the courts have means to control 
the awards. As already stated in Chapter 1, the public policy exception concerns arbitrary 
and foreign domestic awards in the same way. Although foreign domestic awards might face 
other restrictions, this can be argued a minus a majore, because even an arbitral award, 
which is based on the will of parties to be judged in this way, is subject to control of the public 
policy exception.  
After the ECJ made clear in the Eco Swiss case that the courts of the member states have to 
check a violation of trans-European public policy83, the question arising is, how and to what 
extent can a court check an award that is supposed to be final (at least for arbitrary awards), 
without violating the finality of the award? 
There are three tests to be found, how public policy violations can be checked by the courts. 
Unfortunately, the ECJ has not stated clearly so far which test is to be favourable. 
3.3.2.5.2. Prima Facie Test 
Among other experts, Schlosser84 promotes the prima facie test, and bases his promotion on 
the argument that the public policy exception “is only justified where the non-conformity with 
                                                
82 Christoph Liebscher, European Public Policy- a black box? Journal of International Arbitration. Vol. 
17 No 3 (2000) pp 73- 88, Page 80 af 
83 See also Shelkoplyas, Natalya. The application of EC law in arbitration proceedings / Natalya 
Shelkoplyas. Groningen : Europa Law Pub., 2003. 2003 DH 341.754 SHEL Page 119-122 
84 Peter F. Schlosser, Arbitration and European Public Policy in: L Arbitrage et le Droit European 
(Bruylant, Brussels 1997) pages 81-96 at page 83 and following 
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basic principles of morality and justice (…) is evident”. The prima facie test only allows the 
public policy exception only where the public policy violation is visible on the face of the 
award/obvious/clearly visible in the award itself without considering the merits or the 
circumstances under which the award was given. 
French 85 and Austrian86 Courts have applied this test occasionally. However, there seems to 
be a tendency to apply this test only if the award was rendered in a European Community 
state, since otherwise, serious violation of public policy in the merits of the award might 
remain unchecked. The Austrian Courts have widened the test to authorise the enforcement 
court to review the award in a case where the arbitrators have failed to deal with the issues 
of illegality of the underlying contract between the parties.87  
3.3.2.5.3. Effect Test 
The effect test checks if the solution found by the arbitral tribunal violates public policy. 
Violations of public policy which do not have this effect are irrelevant. The difference to the 
prima facie test, which also is focused on the solution is that the effect test also considers the 
circumstances and the case. There is a full review of facts and rules of law in so far as they 
might constitute a possible violation of public policy88. 
This test is applied by the German Courts.89 The German High Court found: “This is why, in 
this context, it is irrelevant if the arbitral tribunal wanted to circumvent German law or if it 
applied the law erroneously; this is because (…) only the facts and the result matter”90
3.3.2.5.4. Equivalence Test 
The equivalence test only checks if the outcome of the award violated public policy like in the 
effect test. In a second step, the court then “may supplant reasons expressed in the award 
85 Case. 19 Nov. 1991 Grand Moulins de Strasbourg v. Continental France [1992] Rev. Arb. 76 from 
the Healthy Award Page 56 
86 OHG 23 February 1998 [1999] 24a Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration Page 923 ff, from the 
Healthy Award Page 56 
87 OHG 11 May 1983 [1985] 10 Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration Page 421ff from the Healthy 
Award Page 56 
88 See Christoph Liebscher, European Public Policy- a black box? Journal of International Arbitration. 
Vol. 17 No 3 (2000) pp 73- 88, Page 82 af 
89 Ibid page 67 
90 Ibid page 68 
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by others that, in its view, justify the holding”.91 The difference, to the effect test, lies in the 
following: where an award would be rendered as contrary to public policy under the effect 
test, because of the merits, the court itself can find other reasons that justify the outcome, 
and uphold the award. 
On the first view, this test appears to cope best with the problems in respect to the finality of 
the award and the public policy exception. The final award is upheld wherever possible, and 
public policy is respected, too. However it could be argued that the equivalence test violates 
essential provisions of material justice. The enforcement procedure is not supposed to be a 
supervisory instance to decide on the merits; especially since there is no procedural 
guarantee that the court guarantees the parties a due process. If there are new issues 
considered in the execution process, then the parties must not only have the possibility to 
represent their arguments on these issues, but also they have to proove them. This 
supervisory process appears to be a fundamental violation with respect to the finality of the 
award.  
3.3.2.6. Conclusion on trans-European public policy 
There is a trans-European public policy not only existing in theory but also applied by the 
courts. The criteria by which the public policy exception is to be found is not the principle of 
supremacy, nor the principle of uniform application of EC law, but the fundamental 
importance of the content of the provision/law. These fundamental provisions in European 
Community Law appear to be according to Schlosser92 and Liebscher93: 
 - Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty (competition regulations) 
- The five freedoms (transnational trade, services, establishment, movement of capital and 
movement of workers) 
- All provisions of the EC Treaty against discrimination based on nationality or gender and 
- The compensation of the agent according to Article 19 of the Directive 86/653/EEC on 
commercial agents 
                                                
91 Racine, see the Healthy Award Page 59 
92 Peter F. Schlosser, Arbitration and European Public Policy in: L Arbitrage et le Droit European 
(Bruylant, Brussels 1997) pages 81-96 at page 85 Schlosser further states that a directive “will 
become part of European public policy from the moment when it had to be implemented”, but he 
continues that “it may, however, occur that individual justice requires that (…) an arbitral award should 
be recognized even in such circumstances.” 
93 Christoph Liebscher , The Healthy Award page 60 
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Any award violating these rules might be refused enforcement in the EC states. Schlosser 
states, however, that individual justice might require enforcement, even when in conflict with 
trans-European public policy94. 
  
 
3.4.  Reasons for the absence of a uniform definition for public policy 
As we have seen above, there are various scopes of public policies: simple public policy, 
international public policy and transnational public policy. After having concluded that there 
are transnational public policy systems existing and operating, the question arises whether a 
worldwide definition of what the contents of such a transnational public policy might be, can 
be provided.  
Dr. Lew95 observed that a totally comprehensive definition of normal public policy has never 
been found. He reasoned that this was because public policy reflects the fundamental 
economic, legal, moral, political, religious and social standards of every state or extra 
national community. This difference of public policy derives from the character or structure of 
the state or community and covers those principles and standards which are so sacrosanct 
to the state or community as to require their maintenance at all costs and without exception. 
To put it in other words: every state has its own public policy and since there are many 
states, there are various public policies. As they differ from each other, there cannot be a 
definition that in its scope fully captures them all. A majore a minus, this can also be argued 
for international and transnational public policies. 
However, there might be a fundamental element or several fields with a similar content of 
international or transnational public policy. Intrinsic to the nature of international public policy, 
this fundamental element might exist in the violation of basic notions of morality and justice of 
the forum state. 
These basic notions of morality and justice will be examined in the next chapter      
94 See last footnote referring to Schlosser 
95 Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana 1978) Page 532 
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CHAPTER 4. The content of the public policy exception 
4.1. General 
The concept of the international public policy exception includes a substantive and a 
procedural category. While the substantive public policy (ordre public au fond) tests the 
recognition of rights and obligations received from the award and its circumstances, the 
procedural public policy applies to the process in which the award was found. 
 The substantive category can be divided into four sub-categories, which are96: 
(1) mandatory laws 
(2) fundamental principles of law 
(3) public order or good morals 
(4) national interests  
The procedural category consists of the principles which are, more or less, fundamental to a 
guarantee of due process.  
Some cases are boxed in more than one category. For example, corruption of the arbitrators 
could transgres the pertinent categories (1) to (4) and some procedural categories, such as 
the principle of an fair trial, independent judge, and so on. 
Furthermore, different legal systems may classify certain prohibitions under different 
categories or might not recognize certain violations at all under the public policy exception.97  
International public policy consists of fundamental rules only because, in its application, it 
faces a major counter player, which is the finality of the award seeking enforcement. This is 
particularly the case for the enforcement of international arbitral awards. International arbitral 
awards are, in most states, enforced according to the regulations of the New York 
Convention. The NYC reflects a “pro-enforcement bias” giving effect, as far as possible, to 
the finality of international arbitral awards by discouraging the reinvestigation of issues in a 
national court that have already been determined, according to the will of the parties which 
choose to resolve their dispute by means of arbitration.  
The United States of America strongly follows this “pro-enforcement bias”, although 
                                                
96 ILA report on: Page 227 
97 see discussion and definition of the term public policy in the Uncitral model law; United Nations 
Document A/40/17, Section 297  
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execution under U$ 100 000, 00 is not profitable, due to excessively high execution costs98. 
In the Mitsubishi Motors Corp. vs. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc., the US Court of Appeal 
restated its strong presumption of favouring and upholding international arbitration awards 
with respect to international comity99, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational 
tribunals and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability 
in the resolution of disputes.  
In general the violation of public policy by the award has to weigh heavier than the principle 
of finality of the award. 
 
4.2. Substantive Categories of Public Policy 
4.2.1. Mandatory laws/Lois de police, règles impératives 
4.2.1.1. The Theory 
“A mandatory rule is an imperative provision of law which must be applied to an international 
relationship irrespective of the law that governs that relationship.”100
To put it in other words: règles impèratives, Anglice, mandatory rules, are prohibitive or 
preventive rules of a state. Provisions that are so essential to a state that they cannot be 
circumvented and demand enforcement without exception and overrule and displace the 
proper law in the conflict of laws by the lex fori  are international mandatory rules (or lois de 
police)101 of the lex fori state. International mandatory provisions also prevail over law and 
regulations chosen by the parties. A mandatory provision is a provision that protects 
fundamental interests of the forum state`s policy that every time the state would enforce an 
award incompatible with its mandatory provision, it would violate the states policy, heavily. 
4.2.1.2. The Practice 
This theory is applied in a different way in practice. The courts of many countries have 
                                                
98 Professor Dr. Ralf A. Schütze, Koordination und Konflikte im Transatlantischen Rechtsverkehr in 
Tagungsbericht der Fachgruppe Arbitration/Litigation/Mediation, Page 3 
99 Pervasive problems in international arbitration / edited by Loukas A. Mistelis and Julian D.M. Lew. 
Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International ; Frederick, MD : Sold and distributed in North, Cent 
2006 DH 341.522 PERV Page 30-38 
100 ILA report Page 230 
101 Natalya Shelkoplyas, the Application of EC Law in Arbitration Proceedings; Europa Law Publishing, 
Groningen 2003 DH 341 754 SHEL Page 360. 
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concluded that not all of their respective prohibitive or proscriptive laws are relevant when 
considering whether or not to enforce a foreign award. In some of these countries every 
(international) public policy rule is mandatory, but not every mandatory rule forms part of the 
public policy.102 The Indian Supreme Court expressed this, when it found that: “in order to 
attract the bar of public policy, the enforcement of the award must involve something more 
than the violation of the law of India.”103       
France, by and large, regards its loi de police as part of its (international) public policy. While, 
in England, there seems to be no clear separation between public policy and mandatory 
rules, Switzerland does not regard mandatory rules as a part of public policy, but this does 
not change anything in the application, since, then, enforcement will be refused due to 
mandatory rules instead of public policy. Germany regards its mandatory rules (zwingendes 
Recht) as the highest/prior category of public policy rules, similar to the French approach.104. 
4.2.1.3. The relation between (international) public policy and mandatory rules 
This finding appears somehow strange since one would expect that the state enforces its 
mandatory rules without exception.  
It gets even more complex when taking into account Professor Mayer’s statement, that there 
is a common observation that international public policy is narrower than internal public 
policy (because it focuses only on fundamental provisions) and has no relevance for the 
applicability of mandatory rules. This is due to the nature of mandatory rules to be 
necessarily applicable, regardless of how international the arbitration might be. In addition, 
the body of international public policy rules can in fact be wider than domestic public policy 
rules, because there are a number of mandatory rules, which apply exclusively to 
international relationships.105
However the situation becomes clear, when looking at the German law system.  
Under German domestic private law, only certain provisions can be derogated by the parties. 
All the other provisions cannot be derogated. Then, there is Article 34 EGBgb. The EGBgb, 
in Germany, regulates the conflict of laws. The Article states: 
“Dieser Unterabschnitt berührt nicht die Anwendung der Bestimmungen des deutschen 
Rechts, die ohne Rücksicht auf das auf den Vertrag anzuwendende Recht den Sachverhalt 
                                                
102 ILA Page 230 
103 AIR 1994 SC page 880 citied from ILA Page 231 
104 Christoph Liebscher, the healthy award, Page 353 
105 ILA Page 231 
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zwingend regeln.“ 
(This section [determining the proper law] does not apply, where mandatory rules of the 
German Law, which apply on the facts of the case without regard to the proper law of the 
contract, govern the subject) 
 
The mandatory provisions which apply on the facts of the case without regard to the proper 
law of the contract are just a small scope of the prohibitive or preventive laws. This principle 
is also applied when it comes to the enforcement of foreign awards. Where an award violates 
these “international” mandatory rules, it is refused enforcement on the ground of international 
public policy. 
So, the relation between public policy and mandatory rules, is as follows: 
There are mandatory rules that do not form part of international public policy, because they 
do not regulate subjects that are fundamental enough to from part of international public 
policy. Such provisions might be the requirement of certain formal procedures to conclude a 
contract or to transfer ownership. Furthermore, there are mandatory rules that only form part 
of international public policy, because of their nature they only apply in international cases. 
Such provisions might be export laws or provisions relating to foreign investment. 
The fundamental mandatory rules that form part of the international public policy mostly have 
a political background. There are various international provisions: competition regulations106, 
currency controls, environmental protection laws, measures of embargo, blockade or boycott, 
or laws falling in the rather different category of legislation designed to protect the parties 
presumed to be in an inferior bargaining position, such as wage earners, consumers, 
shareholders and commercial agents107  
 
4.2.2. Fundamental principles of law 
4.2.2.1. General 
The phrase “fundamental principles” of law is used by some courts to apply broadly, they are  
general principles which contrast with specific legislative provisions. Among these principles 
are those of pacta sunt servanda, veniere contra factum proprium, the principle of good faith 
(bona fide), the prohibition of uncompensated expropriation, the prohibition of discrimination, 
                                                
106 From the transnational public policy of the EC, which was investigated above, the competition 
provisions in Articles 81 and 82, as well as the five freedoms are fundamental mandatory provisions of 
EU law.   
107 See Professor Mayer in ILA Page 230 
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the freedom of the party to act in its disfavour (volenti non fit injuria) and the protection of 
those incapable to act108. 
It is well known, that these terms are interpreted in slightly different manners in different law 
systems, and that there will be no uniform interpretation of these principles. The core 
essence of the principles, however, basically is the same. 
The principle of pacta sunt servanda includes the principle of the validity of the contract 
(favor contrarius) and the principle that every party has to do what they promised to the other 
party. 
Inconsistent behaviour will not be tolerated, according to the principle of venire contra factum 
proprium. A party acting inconsistently might face being held up in particular on the acting, 
which is to its disadvantage. Together with the principle of bona fide, as well as the security 
of international transactions it prohibits, for example, that a state of public entity be allowed to 
invoke, after the execution of a contract, alleged irregularities such as the absence of those 
special powers which would for instance be required under domestic law for the signing of 
arbitration undertakings.109
The principle of bona fide means, somehow utopically, that the parties trust the promises of 
each other. Not every action of the one party has to be questioned on its validity by the other 
party, unless the other party should have reasonable doubts. For example, where a party has 
a long-time business relationship with an agent acting on behalf of a principal, there the party 
does not need to question the power of representation of the agent, unless there is 
reasonable doubt.  
The prohibition of uncompensated expropriation is only an essence of the principle of unjust 
enrichment, meaning, that nobody has to suffer unjustified losses. Today, this principle is 
often referred to as no expropriation without prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation.110 .  
From the autonomy of the will, derives the principle volenti non fit injuria, which means that 
any action according to the will of the party, even if it is against itself, can never be injustice. 
Only in cases where the party is incapable to act, permanently or just temporarily, it has to be 
protected. 
 
108 ILA Page 233 
109 see ICCA para 139 
110 Redfern and Hunter Chapter 11 Sections 31,32 
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4.2.2.2. Special application: unlawful relief - punitive damages 
Punitive damages, exemplary damages and triple damages are reliefs that do not attempt to 
compensate actual losses of the enforcing party, but carry a penal element. They seek to 
punish the party in precedence cases, so the party has to adopt its behaviour. The idea 
behind this special form of damages is the following: 
Real compensations or actual damages might be easily affordable for the prospective losing 
party, especially for multinational concerns. For them, it might be cheaper to pay the actual 
damages, than to change their products or behaviour. When faced with punitive damages 
however, the situation is different. The party feels the compensation because it consists of a 
penal damage. The winning party gets its compensations and some extra money, on which 
income tax might have to be paid. Punitive damages are extremely profitable for the winning 
party and layers often get percentages of the award if they are successful. In the US, f.e.g. 
costs are not part of the actual damage and cannot be demanded by the parties, the 
instrument of punitive damages is also used to compensate for the costs of the winning 
party.111   
One principle of law, at least in European states, is that only state courts can relieve punitive 
awards, and only where the punished violation falls into its scope. However, the substantive 
law of many countries does not allow exemplary or punitive damages at all.  
In an ICCA Case112, a claim for punitive damages was refused in an arbitration taking place 
in Geneva with New York Law as the proper law of the contract, on the grounds that 
damages beyond the compensatory damages constituted a punishment of the defendant 
which was held incompatible with Swiss public policy. German Courts have consistently ruled 
that awards warranting overcompensation are contrary to German pubic policy and 
enforcement of the punitive damage will be refused113. However, in accordance with Article 
40 III EGBgb, parts of the award may be enforced, where the winning party seeks 
compensation for reasonable costs. Excessively high costs, especially payments that rely on 
the success of the claimant are not recognized114  
                                                
111 Christopher B. Kuner, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
the United States and West Germany under the New York Convention, Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 7 No. 4 (1990) pp 71-92 
112 ICCA Case no 5946 reported in 1991 XVI Yearbook 97 
113 Professor Dr. Ralph A. Schütze, Koordination und Konflikte im transatlantischen Rechtsverkehr, 
Tagungsbericht der Fachgruppe Arbitration/Mediation/Litigation Page 3 
114 Ibid 
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As a notable exception, the United States and Australia115, seem to recognize foreign awards 
with punitive damages, and it has even been confirmed, that claims for punitive damages are 
arbitrable under US law116. This constitutes a pro-arbitration approach, and sets arbitration 
as a real alternative to litigation.117 However, there is a decision in the case of Laminoirs –
Trefileries-Cableries de Lens SA vs. Southwire Co., in which the Georgia court refused 
enforcement of the arbitral award. The award (which was in accordance with French law) 
concluded that the interest rates on the amount in dispute should rise by five per cent p.a., 
two months from the date of the award. This was seen by the Georgia court to be a penal 
element rather than a compensatory element and, therefore, the award was partially refused 
enforcement118. 
Today, after the US courts even enforce arbitral awards awarding punitive damages, this 
case might be decided differently by the US courts.  
4.2.2.3. Muslim Shari`a 
The Muslim Shari`a is a school of law that is very different from most modern systems of law. 
Nevertheless, this religious law provides a number of provisions essential in those countries 
that do apply the Shari`a. Especially in Arabic states, this school of law is widely established, 
and enforcement of foreign awards is easily denied on grounds of the public policy violation 
of fundamental principles of the Shari`a. 
Surprisingly the Shari`a, which consists of four major schools119, recognises arbitration in 
                                                
115 ILA Page 233 for further information see: XL Petroleum NSW Pty Ltd vs. Caltex Oil (Aust.) Pty Ltd 
(1985) 155 CLR 448 
116 ILA Page 233 for further information see: Willis v. Shearson and American Express Inc. 569 F 
Supp. 821 (DCNC, 1983) 
117 ILA Page 233 for further information see: In the matter of arbitration between Marco Barbier and 
Sheardson Lehman Hutton Inc. (1991) 6 Mealey`s International Arbitration Reports 14 at B1 
118 Christopher B. Kuner, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
the United States and West Germany under the New York Convention, Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 7 No. 4 (1990) pp 71-92, Page 80 referring to Laminoirs –Trefileries-Cableries de 
Lens SA vs. Southwire Co. (484 F Paragraph 1063 ND Ga. 1980) 
119 The Hanafi school, founded c.699-767 AD in Iraq; the Mâliki school, founded in c. 713- 95 AD in the 
City of Medina, the Shafi school founded around .769–819 in Ghazzah, Egypt; the Hanbali school 
founded in c. 780-855 AD in Bagdad ; from Saleh, Samir. Commercial arbitration in the Arab Middle 
East : Shari`a, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt / Samir Saleh ; fo Oxford ; Portland, Or. : Hart Pub., 2006. 
2006 DH 347.090956 SALE  Page 8 
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general where the following provisions are fulfilled120:  
a) a dispute ( judicial or extrajudicial) 
b) two competent parties willing to submit the dispute to an arbitrator, who though not a 
judge, must possess the qualifications of a qâdi (judge); 
c) the acceptance, by the appointed arbitrator to carry out his duty to adjudicate in the 
dispute 
d) the determination of the dispute according to the procedural rules of the Shari`a 
e) a prior agreement to arbitrate (arbitration clause) is not required  
However, when it comes to the enforcement of foreign awards (from courts or by means of 
arbitration), it seems as if this is hardly possible under the Shari`a. 
“It would be unrealistic to attempt a study of the enforcement of foreign awards by Shari`a 
courts, since too many adverse factors exist in Shari`a for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign awards to be possible.  
Among these factors is the Shari`a concept of arbitration as a closed and essentially religious 
process, the stringent conditions for qualification to sit as an arbitrator121, the very essence of 
the award, which, despite the initially contractual nature of the arbitration agreement, 
acquires ultimately judicial character, and finally, the division of the world into dar al-Harb 
and dar al-Islâm [unbelieving world and world believing in Islam]. All discourage further 
elaboration on the subject. 
However, it is useful, to attempt to know what would constitute a foreign award under the 
Shari`a. Here again the matter is not dealt with in classical Shari`a treatises, and the answer 
must be based on fragmentary material. A foreign award is basically an award made under a 
law other than the Shari`a. The award thus fails to fulfil the main Shari`a requirements: the 
qualification of the arbitrator and the application of the Shari`a law. It is submitted that if one 
of the conditions demanded by Shari`a is not fulfilled, the award will be considered a foreign 
award. Conversely, it seems that the issue of an award in dar al-Harb which fulfils Shari`a 
conditions in all other respects would not confer a foreign character on the award. 
A difficult and unresolved question arises in the case where the award is made under the 
domestic statute law of the Muslim Ruler and is thus subject to a domestic secular law other 
than Shari`a. From the Shari`a perspective, a secular domestic law, and a fortiori when it 
violates Shari`a tenets, is treated as a foreign law. In this respect, the co-existence of secular 
courts with Shari`a courts would, in practice, mitigate the complexity of the problem because 
120 Ibid Page 15,16 
121 “In contrast to Western laws, which are generally increasingly liberal with regard to the 
qualifications required of arbitrators, and with Western practice, which often stresses the technical 
skills of arbitrators, Shari`a requires that rigid conditions be met in the person of the arbitrator. These 
conditions mainly concern Muslim faith, gender and knowledge of Shari`a. Under Shari`a the 
arbitrators have to possess the same qualifications of Shari`a judges. There are of course other highly 
desirable qualities required of an arbitrator, these relate mainly to his position and behaviour while 
conducting judicial hearings and in his private life.” Ibid Page 28  
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the enforcement of an award subject to domestic statute could, most conveniently, be sought 
before the secular courts. 
Attempted enforcement before Shari`a courts would inevitably lead to a deadlock.”122  
 
However, the Shari`a is not applied in every country where Muslims live. The United Arab 
Emirates have, for example, become a member of, and ratified,123 the New York Convention 
on the enforcement of international arbitral awards, thus they have a Shari`a-based law 
system. This is made possible by making a difference between commercial law (Western) 
and family and heritage law (Shari`a). 
Saudi Arabia refuses to enforce awards dealing with the concept of profit (which is contrary 
to the Hanbali Muslim doctrine) and awards made by non-Muslim arbitrators and aleatory 
contracts124. 
Other states do not apply the Shari`a strictly. In Egypt or Syria, an award generally will be 
enforced if it does not guarantee legal interest- or in Kuwait, contractual interest- which would 
be accepted by Libyan law125 .  
  
 
4.2.3. Contrary to good morals /public order 
Certain activities are regarded as contra bonos mores (against good morals) virtually the 
world over. To mention some examples: piracy, terrorism, genocide, slavery, smuggling, drug 
trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking, fraud, bribery and paedophilia. Agreements 
with such activities are usually illegal and unenforceable. 
Since traders of slaves, terrorists and pirates have found other means to solve their disputes, 
there are hardly any court decisions refusing enforcement of awards connected with such 
disputes. However there are two cases (though, dating back to 1855) concerned with 
slavery. The two cases involved the ships Créole and Maria Luz126. The first case was 
122 Saleh, Samir. Commercial arbitration in the Arab Middle East : Shari`a, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt / 
Samir Saleh ; fo Oxford ; Portland, Or. : Hart Pub., 2006. 2006 DH 347.090956 SALE, Pages 64,65 
123 signature May 2006, ratification November 2006 
124 ILA Page 234 
125 Ibid 
126 ICCA Para 113 
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decided by the Mixed Commission of London on 15 January 1855 and the Maria Luz by the 
Tsar of Russia on 17-29 May 1875. The two cases were slightly different, but raised the 
same basic question: should the rights of ownership of slaves be recognized, when such 
slaves were transported by the owner in a ship which failed to reach its final destination due 
to a mutiny of the slaves (Créole) or their liberation by the Japanese military (Maria Luz)? 
Though both decisions come to different conclusions, they constitute significant landmarks in 
the law of nations (as transnational public policy was called at that time) with respect to 
human rights. The English award recognises the right of the owner of his slaves, and states: 
“We do not think it is necessary to refer to authorities to demonstrate that slavery, however 
odious and contrary to the principles of justice and humanity, may be recognized by the law 
of a given country, and that since it has in fact been established in several States, it cannot 
be contrary to the law of nations.”127
The Russian award of 1875 states that the Japanese government, having freed the slaves in 
keeping with its own laws and customs has not violated neither the general rules of the law of 
nations nor the provisions of particular treaties128. Between the two awards lies about a 
quarter of a century, so it might well be possible that in this time the law of nations had 
changed significantly, and by 1875 slavery was contrary to bonos mores of all so-called 
“civilised Nations”. This thesis is supported by the American Civil War (1861-1865), which 
was, among other reasons, fought because of the contentious issue of slavery abolition and 
after which the winning Northern States abolished slavery in the whole of the United States.   
 
Regarding terrorism, there is a recent decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal. An English 
company had been forced by the Irish Republican Army to pay a ransom of 2 million Pound 
Sterling and serious threats had been made by the Irish organization towards the firm, and 
one of its managers in particular. The amount was transferred from Switzerland via various 
stopovers to a bank in Ireland. The legal point of dispute was the admissibility of a request by 
the UK for judicial assistance in criminal matters, of which the Swiss bank opposed. The 
Swiss bank based its objection particularly on the danger that the IRA would later similarly 
threaten some of the bank’s customers and the risk that the victim, having yielded to 
blackmail, be prosecuted under English law129. 
127 ibid at Para 114 
128 Ibid at Para 115 
129 Ibid at Para 96 
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The Federal Tribunal rejected the opposition of the bank, reasoning that all the required 
conditions for judicial assistance were fulfilled and pointed out that, in all States, there exists 
a major public interest in the prosecution of terrorism, which must prevail over private 
interests of the businessmen and agents concerned. No bank and no State member of the 
legal community of western Europe, including Switzerland, could accept to become, through 
negligence, a turning point or basis for the financial operations of terrorist movements.130   .  
Probably, the most commonly known decision relating to good morals is the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal in Soleimany vs. Soleimany131 in 1998, where enforcement of an 
arbitral award was refused. The award dealt with a contract between father and son, which 
required the son to smuggle carpets out of Iran, in breach of Iranian export laws. The award 
under the chosen proper Jewish law recognized the illegality of the enterprise, but gave 
priority to the rights of the parties to the sale proceeds and awarded the son a share of the 
proceeds from the sale of the carpets.  
Contracts concerning smuggling have given rise to judicial decisions in several states for a 
fairly long time. Mostly, they were considered null and void either on the basis of respect for 
foreign law, or because of solidarity with foreign States or by a sort of general and diffuse 
concern for contractual morality.132 Various German and French decisions from the boom 
period of smuggling in the first half of the 20th century, strongly apply this principle of good 
morals on cases concerned with smuggling. To quote a French judgement of about thirty 
years ago: 
“If French judges are not called upon to sanction in French courts the violations committed 
abroad against the public policy of a given State, nevertheless, they must consider as illegal 
and, therefore, devoid of validity smuggling operations which, as they violate foreign laws, do 
infringe as in the present case international public policy (…)”133    
Another case related to smuggling was a case decided by the German Federal Court in 
1982134, where an insurance contract relating to cultural artefacts illegally exported from 
Nigeria was considered null and void and against bonos mores in the meaning of the 
German Code on Civil Procedure.  
130 Ibid at Para 97 
131 England: Soleimany vs. Soleimany (1998) 3 WLR 811[1999] QB 785 (CA)  
132 ICCA at Para 84 
133 Ibid 
134 Germany: German Supreme Court decision on Allgemeine Versicherung G.H. gegen E.K., E.K. 
BGHZ 59, Seite 82  
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The Italian Tribunal of Turin came to the conclusion in its judgement of a similar case in 1982 
that Italian international public policy was always inspired by, and based upon, essential 
values that are expressly recognized by the UNESCO Convention of 1970 (which was not 
applicable on the case for several reasons), relating to measures aimed at prohibiting the 
illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural goods135. 
With regard to bribery, the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign 
Officials in International Transactions,136 reflects the international concern for the prevalence 
of corrupt trading practices: According to this convention, it is arguable that there is an 
international consensus that corruption and bribery are contrary to international public policy. 
The Court of Appeal in Paris recognized in 1993137 that a contract having as its object a 
traffic occurring through the payment of bribes is, consequently , contrary to French 
international public policy and to the ethics of international commerce as understood by the 
large majority of States in the international community138. Condemnation of corruption may 
consequently be characterized as either the application of a general principle of law 
recognized by “civilized nations”, or as the recognition of a substantive law of necessary 
application, or as a resort to a transnational public policy; not withstanding the variety of the 
labels or expressions used, the same concept is, in fact, involved.139
Other examples, of conduct contrary to bonos mores are contractual practices aimed at 
facilitating drug traffic, the traffic of arms between private persons, contracts aimed at 
favouring kidnapping, murder or violation of human rights.140 Other activities are treated 
differently among the states. Casino contracts (e.g. betting) for example are illegal in some 
countries and not in others.141
The real problem, with the good morals principle, lies less in the fact that certain actions are 
contrary to good morals or public order, but rather in that the award itself will rarely carry the 
violation of good morals on its face. 
135 See ICCA Paragraph 33 
136 signed on 17 December 1997 and came to effect on 15 February 1999 
137 France: European Gas Turbines SA. Vs. Westman International Ltd. 30 September 1993 reported 
in the (1995) XX Yearbook Page 198 
138 See ILA Page 234,235 
139 See ICCA paragraph 120 
140 Ibid 129 
141 ILA Page 235 
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The enforcing court has to dig deeper into the subject matter of the award and into the 
circumstances of which the decision was given. This re-examination might be contrary to the 
principle of the finality of the award, as already discussed above. Meanwhile, there seems to 
be a reasonable solution to this violation of the principle of the finality of the award: the 
enforcement court examines wether the deciding court or arbitrator has investigated and 
reasonably decided on the prospective violation of good morals. Where the deciding court or 
arbitrator has failed to do so, the enforcement court intervenes. 
4.2.4. National interests/foreign relations 
In the last categories of substantive international public policy, the decision about which 
national interests belong to the public policy, and which do not, is treading on ice. The courts` 
decisions vary significantly. 
The US Court of Appeal, in Parsons & Whittemore,142 held that public policy was not the 
same as national policy in the sense of diplomatic or foreign policy. Consequently, it decided 
not to refuse enforcement of an arbitral award in favour of the Egyptian party simply because 
of tensions at that time between the US and Egypt. The award reasoned that the American 
defendant was in breach of contract in abandoning the construction, of a paperboard mill in 
Egypt, after Egypt had broken off diplomatic relations with the US just prior to the Six Day 
War. The US Court found that enforcement would be refused only where the conflicting 
national policy would forbid performance of the contract, i.e., in case there were a US-
embargo against Egypt143.  
This US pro-enforcement attitude was confirmed in the later case, National Oil Corp. vs. 
Libyan Sun Oil Corp.144, in which the court rejected a challenge to an award at the 
enforcement stage on the ground that it was in favour of Libya, as the defendant argued, a 
state known to sponsor international terrorism. The court noted that the US still recognized 
the government of Libya and had not declared war on it. The court said: 
“To read the public policy defence as a parochial device protective of national political 
interests would seriously undermine the New York Convention’s utility. This provision was 
not meant to enshrine the vaguaries of international politics under the rubric of public 
142 Parsons&Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. vs.Societe Generale de l industrie du papier RAKTA and 
Bank of America 508 F. 2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1974) 
143 ILA Page 235 
144 National Oil Corp. vs. Libyan Sun Oil Corp. 733 F.Para. 800 at 819 (Delaware, 1990 
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policy”145. 
However, when it comes to awards that breach sanctions, or boycott legislations, the US has 
frozen assets of certain States, and their nationals, and refused enforcement of awards. 
Though it is possible to register a foreign award against such assets, it is not possible to 
execute the award without the permission of the Office of Foreign Asset Control.146.  
4.3. Procedural Categories of Public policy 
4.3.1. General 
It is difficult to separate the procedural categories of public policy from the substantive 
category, and some provisions similar to the substantial categories might appear again. 
Furthermore, there is a problem with the application of procedural public policy, when 
enforcing arbitral awards under the New York Convention. Article 5 I mentions five 
procedural principles that can be raised by the parties and where they are found to be 
violated, they constitute a ground for resisting enforcement of the award. However, the 
enforcement court can not ex officio investigate these violations, and deny enforcement on 
grounds of Article 5 I unless a party has requested the court to investigate the grounds listed 
in Article 5 I. 
This might derive from the autonomy of the parties, and show special respect to their 
decision to solve their dispute without the help of state courts. The consequence of this 
provision regulating that Article 5 I can not be investigated ex officio, is obfuscated. 
On the one side, it is arguable by lex specialis derogat lex generalis, that those five 
provisions of Article 5 I are excluded from the ex officio public policy exception in Article 5 II 
(narrow approach). This argument is underscored by the wording of Article 5, which states in 
5 I: “(…) only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and 
enforcement is sought, proves (…) [it] (…):” 
On the other side, the structure of Article 5 appears to favour a public policy under 
subsection II that includes the exceptions to be raised by the parties mentioned under 
subsection I (wide approach). This can be argued by the unusual approach of Article 5 to 
state special provisions first and then general provisions. Usually in cases where the 
argument lex specialis derogat lex generalis applies, the provisions start with a general 
concept and come to the exceptions afterwards. Furthermore Article 5 I stipulates that the 
burden of proof is on the party raising Article 5 I. Therefore, Article 5 II might regulate 
                                                
145 ILA Page 235 
146 Ibid Page 235 
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something different than sub-paragraph I and, consequently has to include the reasons 
stated under Article 5I for the pure reason of material justice. 
The United Nations Commission`s definition provided in the UNCITRAL model law (see 
above), states that public policy includes procedural and substantive public policy. This does 
not lead any further, since the explanation by the Commission was not given in the NYC and 
even if it would apply in this Convention, it would not answer the question, whether the 
reasons listed under Article 5 I NYC are excluded from the general public policy mentioned 
under Article 5 II.  
When looking for the possible intention/ reason of this ambiguous provision, it becomes 
obvious that a party can only try to resist enforcement by the five grounds in Article 5 I. The 
court may find that public policy is violated and refuse enforcement. But this does not answer 
the question whether the court can refuse enforcement on the grounds mentioned under 5 I 
by referring to public policy. The failure of the party, against which the award is to be 
enforced, to request to refuse execution might constitute a waiver or implies that the party 
does not see its rights violated in the course of the arbitration (volenti non fit injuria). 
Since this question cannot be answered in a satisfactory way in theory, it will be necessary to 
look at the various court decisions and examine the practice. This will be necessary anyway, 
since procedural categories of public policy might be applied when refusing enforcement of 
foreign domestic court decisions or arbitral awards that do not fall under the NYC.   
 
4.3.2. Lack of Jurisdiction 
Where the awarding arbitrator or the awarding court lacks its jurisdiction from the 
enforcements courts point of view, procedural public policy appears to be violated. 
With regard to foreign domestic court judgements the enforcement courts usually first tests, if 
the awarding court had jurisdiction by applying the enforcements court lex fori . In German 
this is called the “Spiegelbidtheorie” (Mirror theory). The enforcements courts lex fori  usually 
consist of various rules to determine the jurisdiction, i.e. the choice of the court of jurisdiction 
by the parties and the principle of the closest connection. Where the foreign court lacks its 
jurisdiction according to this test, the enforcement court will deny recognition on the ground 
of lack of jurisdiction.147
147 Britta Rabbow-Geiss, Vorsitzende Richterin am Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart,“Die Vollstreckung 
ausländischer Schiedssprüche in Deutschland”, http://www.cis-legal-reform.org/publication/articles-
reports/vollstreckung-auslaendischer-schiedssprueche-deutschland.de.html 15/2/2007 
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With regard to Arbitration there are some matters that cannot be solved by means of 
Arbitration. Matters related with consumer protection, anti-trust and competition cases 
(controversial), intellectual and industrial property rights are just some fields which usually fall 
under mandatory regulations that stipulate litigation in usually specialised domestic courts. 
Where the dispute is about a subject open to arbitration, the validity of arbitration agreement 
has to be investigated. Where the arbitration agreement does not exist or is found to be null 
and void, the courts will not recognize the award.148
With respect to the principle of state immunity, to which a state party might refer to resist 
recognition and enforcement, it seems to be agreed upon transnationaly, that a State cannot 
subsequently claim immunity from jurisdiction after it has signed a contract like a usual 
private person or after it entered into an arbitration process149. However the state might still 
be able to resist successfully execution of the award150. 
This principle is fundamental, because where it is violated; the parties are deprived of its 
guaranteed/proper judge. 
 
4.3.3. Fraus legis 
Fraus legis is given in the private international law of some countries, when parties manage 
to change or displace in an artificial although formally legal manner, the connecting factors 
used in the rule to determine the proper law and jurisdiction. The domicile, nationality, or loci 
contrarius (place of contract) usually are the connecting factors that are changed. Where this 
happens with the intention to bring about the application of a definite law, or to create a 
particular jurisdiction, and to derogate a law or a jurisdiction that could usually not be 
derogated and was mandatory therefore, fraus legis is given.151
There is a controversial discussion whether fraus legis forms part of public policy or is a 
principle on its own, since it consists of a fraudulent element. However in those legal 
systems, which only sanction a fraud upon the lex fori , it is very near the notion of public 
policy. In other states where fraud also is sanctioned upon the foreign law, it appears rather 
148 Ibid 
149 The state does not loose its immunity if it only appears in front of the arbitration court to raise the 
immunity exception.  
150 Redfern+Hunter Chapter 11 
151 ICCA at Para 21 
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as an independent correction to the ordinary functioning of the conflict rules.152  
Fraus legis is a very rare ground on which courts base their decision. This comes from the 
very nature of the connection factors: Where a party legally can change the connection 
factors easily, there the legislator must have had the intention to allow the parties to change 
them easily and would not want to sanction their perfectly legal choice. Furthermore, where 
changing the connection factors is complex, permanently and can only take place under 
heavy expenses, it is tricky to proof the parties their real intention, keeping in mind, that they 
might have more reasons for their actions. 
In the Australian Golden Acres153 case, the choice of law clause was found not to be bonna 
fide and consequently not accepted by the court. The parties had entered into a contract for 
sale of land in Australia. To avoid Australian mandatory regulations, under which estate 
agents had to be registered, the parties choose the law of Hong Kong as their proper law. 
Instead on the ground of bonna fide, the court could have also applied the mandatory 
provision: “lex res loci”. 
The concept of fraus legis appears to be the counter player to the autonomy of the will of the 
parties regarding the applicable jurisdiction and law. Although there are arguments to be 
found in the literature154 that in times where the autonomy of the will is internationally 
recognised it would be better to abolish the fraus legis principle and rather apply foreign 
corrective elements such as foreign loi de police, the principle serves a useful purpose: It 
protects the misuse of the autonomy of the will. A protection via foreign mandatory laws 
would not have the same effect, since parties could adopt foreign laws without such 
provisions, or choose to transnational laws.       
.  
4.3.4. Fraud/corrupt judge or arbitrator 
There is an international consensus that enforcement of an award should be refused if its 
making was induced or affected by fraudor corruption155. This is not surprising, since the 
impartiality of the judge or arbitrator is heavily affected. 156   
152 ICCA at Para 22 
153 Australia: Golden Acres Ltd. Vs. Queensland Estates Pty Ltd [1969]Qd R 378 
154 ICCA at Para 23 
155 ILA at Page 237 
156 See Kurkela, Matti, 1951- Due process in international commercial arbitration / Matti Kurkela, 
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The UNCITRAL Commission held, that: “it was understood, that the term public policy (..) 
covered fundamental principles of law and justice in substantive, as well as procedural 
respects. Thus, instances such as corruption, bribery and fraud and similar serious cases 
would constitute a ground for setting aside [an affected award]”157    
Several States158 have implied modified UNCITRAL model laws, which expressively provide 
that and award is contrary to public policy if “the making of the award was induced or 
affected by fraud or corruption”.159 The ICSID Convention includes in Article 52 (c) as one of 
the grounds for annulment, that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal. 
Fraud implies some act of deceit perpetrated on the tribunal (e.g. falsified documents, 
perjured evidence) or on the other party. 
Especially in cases with corruption, the question arises if such awards should be refused 
recognition and enforcement per se, or if the party not involved in the corruption should 
rather decide whether the misbehaving party should not be bound to this sick award. There 
are hypothetical scenarios thinkable, where a party might be better of with the sick award 
than with a healthy one. For example think about a case, where one of the three arbitrators 
has accepted money from one of the parties, and by convincing the other two arbitrators 
achieved nothing but the very opposite. So finally the award would be in favour of the sober 
party, which would not have been the case necessarily with a neutral tribunal. Should the 
sober party be disadvantaged by going through a new arbitration? 
Further think of a case, where the prospective loosing party (or the defendant) bribes one of 
the arbitrators, only to win time and to resist enforcement. Similar cases can be constructed 
for fraud. 
A final answer to these questions cannot be given, the court practices vary significantly. 
 
4.3.5. Breach of natural justice/due process 
Natural justice is a very broad and vague term of procedural public policy, and one that fits to 
any complaint from the unsuccessful party. To avoid this term to become pointless, the 
Hannes Snellman. Dobbs Ferry, NY : Oceana Publications, c2005. 2005 DH 341.522 KURK, Page 
156-164, Stateing the duty of the arbitrator to disclose any fact giving rise to doubt the impartiality. 
157 ILA see Footnote 126 of ILA Report 
158 Australia, New Zealand, India and Zimbabwe 
159 ILA Page 237 
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censured action must be a serious irregularity, or as the ICSID Convention states under 
Article 52 (d): “that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure”. A violation of the mandatory arbitration rules of the place of enforcement (which 
would allow the annulment of an equivalent domestic award) may not be a breach of due 
process, such as an award without reasons.160
There are various principles, including equal treatment of the parties, fair notice (to both 
appointment of the tribunal and conduct of the proceedings, confidentiality (only in 
arbitration) and fair and even handed approach to the elucidation of evidence from both 
parties, but the most important principle is the right to present one’s case (“Audi Alteram 
Partem”).161  
The principle of “audiatur et altera pars” basically summes up the concept of equality of the 
parties (principle of contradiction) 162  
4.3.6. Lack of impartiality 
The Latin principle “nemo judex in causa sua” bears the principle of impartiality in itself. 
Almost all systems of law recognise the impartiality of the judge to be a fundamental 
principle. According to German Supreme court decision, “the prohibition to decide in one’s 
own cause is a guarantee of the impartiality of the judge and the arbitrator and the respect of 
this principle belongs to those rules of procedure which are absolutely mandatory.”163
This might be slightly different under New York arbitration law, where in a tribunal only the 
arbitrator not appointed by the parties has to be neutral and the other two can be slightly 
partial in favour of their appointing parties. However, where an arbitrator is challenged, he 
does possess the so called “competence-competence” to decide whether he might be a 
judex in causa sua (judge in his case) or not.164 Important with regards to impartiality might 
be, that the party usually has to challenge the arbitrator or the judge as soon as it gets 
knowledge of the partiality. Otherwise the party might have waived its right to rely on this 
160 ILA Page 238 
161 See Kurkela, Matti, 1951- Due process in international commercial arbitration / Matti Kurkela, 
Hannes Snellman. Dobbs Ferry, NY : Oceana Publications, c2005. 2005 DH 341.522 KURK Chapter / 
Page 171-191 « Audia Alteram Partem » Page182 
162 ICCA Para 146 
163 ICCA Para 145 
164 ICCA Para 150 
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ground.165
4.3.7. Lack of reasons 
There are a number of cases, where it has been argued that failure to give reasons is not a 
reason to refuse enforcement of a foreign award, even if this would be a mandatory 
requirement of any award made in the enforcement state.166 However in theory an award is 
seen to be null and void, when they are rendered without a comprehensive explanations of 
the reasons leading to the decision eventually adopted. The reasoning is considered to be 
essential, since only by its analysis the parties can prove the court of the arbitral tribunal to 
be wrong.167
4.3.8. Manifest disregard of the Law 
Generally, a manifest disregard of the applicable law such as incorrect interpretation of the 
substantive law has been rejected being a sufficient reason to refuse enforcement.168  
Also the application of general rules of law, such as the lex mercatoria has not held being 
contrary to public policy. Austrian and French Courts169 have decided, that public policy is 
165 ILA Page 239 
166See also the Redfern and Hunter at page 831 stating with regard to Unreasoned awards involving 
public policy or mandatory law: 
“(…) it is common in U.S. arbitrations (but not in international practice more generally) for arbitrators to 
issue unreasoned awards. The lack of any requirement for a reasoned award has been held 
applicable to claims based on the federal securities laws. See Antwine v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 
Inc., 735 F.Supp. 1331 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (2d 
Cir. 1972). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 n.20 
(1985) (noting that applicable institutional rules called for transcript of hearing and reasoned award); 
John T. Brady & Co. v. Form-Eze Systems, Inc., 623 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting public policy 
defence on grounds that award did not expressly say that penalty clause was enforceable, although it 
awarded damages equal to amounts specified in the clause). 
Consider Mitsubishi Motors' holding that antitrust claims are arbitrable, provided that the enforcing 
court reserves the right to take a “second look” at the award. See supra pp. 279, 292-93. Is that 
consistent with the lack of any requirement of a reasoned award? Note, Judicial Review of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards on Antitrust Matters After Mitsubishi Motors, 26 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 407 (1988).” 
167 Di Pietro, Domenico. Enforcement of international arbitration awards : the New York Convention of 
1958 / Domenico Di Piet London : Cameron May, 2001. Page 190 
168 Courts in Switzerland, France, England, Germany and the Philippines have decided this. See ILA 
page 239 
169 Gharavi, Hamid G. The international effectiveness of the annulment of an arbitral award / by Hamid 
G. Gharavi. The Hague ; New York : Kluwer Law International, c2002. 2002 DH 341.522 GHAR Page 
77 
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not violated, where the award is based on international lex mercatoria170. English Courts 
even recognise awards based on the basis of lex mercatoria, ex aequo et bono or amiable 
composition171. US courts manifest disregard of the law is generally a defence to resist 
enforcement of an award. However, the term disregard is interpreted narrowly, which implies, 
that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing principle but decides to 
ignore or pay not attention to it. The error must have been obvious and capable of being 
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator172. 
When dealing with lex mercatoria, the question arises, what are the main principles of the lex 
mercatoria? Reference to this set of rules cannot mean that the arbitrator enjoys an unlimited 
freedom. There are said to be the three general principles of the lex mercatioria173: 
(a) the principle of autonomy of the will of the parties, 
(b) the principle of the closest connection, and 
(c) the principle of the legitimate expectations of the parties. 
The third principle basically reflects the notions of the procedural categories of international 
public policy. 
Where an award is obviously in break of one of these principles, there is a manifest disregard 
of the law. Consequently, this implies, that where an award is contrary to a provision of 
procedural international public policy its enforcement can be refused on the grounds of public 
policy. Since this would lead to a circular argument, there is no other solution, but to interpret 
the third principle extremely narrow. 
 
4.3.9. Manifest disregard of the facts 
An arbitral award contrary to the facts or fundamental perverse or irrationality is generally 
regarded as enforceable, since the parties wanted to solve their dispute by this arbitrary 
court. Whereas foreign court decisions might be refused enforcement where the award is 
170 Austria: Austrian Supreme Court, Norsolor SA vs. Pabalk Ticaret Ltd (1984) IX Yearbook 159 
France: Compania Valenciana de Cementos Portland vs. Primary Coal. Inc Cass le civ. 22 October 
1991 (1992) Rev. Arb. 457; decisions citied from ILA Page 240 
171 D.S.T vs. Rakoil [1987] 2 Loyd`s Report 246 decision citied from ILA Page 240 
172 ILA Page 150 
173 ICCA 153 
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contrary to the facts, perverse or irrational.174
However, account must be taken regarding the exceptions or adaptations required by the 
higher principle of good faith, in particular in the field of proof. The arbitrator is bound by the 
principle of good faith when rendering the award and checking the proof. Where an arbitrator 
or a judge violates principles of taking the evidence properly, the due process principle is 
violated175.  
4.3.10. Res judicata 
The principle “ne bis in idem” (not twice in the same matter) requires, that a court judgement 
is not enforced when it was contrary to or inconsistent with a prior judgement or a domestic 
judgement on the same matter. Also where an award has already been enforced and 
executed the ne bis in idem principle would be violated, if the award was enforced a second 
time. English Courts have ruled that this res judicata provision forms part of public policy.176
In Italy and Norway, the principle of res judicata forms part of public policy.177
In countries, like Germany178 and France179, where the principle of res judicata does not from 
part of international public policy, the unsuccessful party still can resist execution of the 
award by raising the res judicata principle.  
4.3.11. Annulment at place of arbitration 
According to the notion of Article 5 I NYC annulment at the place of arbitration does even not 
on the request of a party result in refusement of recognition, since the court “may” refuse 
enforcement but must not. Because the NCY is a good indicator for what is contrary to 
international public policy and what not, it can be concluded, a majore ad minus, that 
annulment of the award at place of arbitration alone cannot automatically lead to the 
refusement of recognition on the public policy grounds. 
 
174 ILA Page 240,241 
175 ICCA Para148 
176 England: E.D. & F. Man (Sugar) Ltd. V. Haryanto (no.2) [1991] 1 Loyd`s Report 429 
177 Moss G.C. International Commercial Arbitration, Party Autonomy and Mandatory Rules, 1999, page 
173 and 328 
178 German Code of Civil procedure 767 analogue 
179 France: CA Paris 9 June 1983 Iro-Holdings vs. Sétilex[1983] Rev Arb 497 
 52
CHAPTER 5. Extent/scope of Review by the Courts 
5.1. Whose Public policy? 
Bearing in mind, that every state theoretically has its own international public policy, the 
question arises, if it is only the public policy of the forum which is relevant to the exequatur 
court, or if there are circumstances in which enforcement of an award might be refused 
where it would not offend the substantive norms of the exequatur State. 
There are cases, like the English case of Regazonni v. KC Sethia Ltd.180 decided in 1958 by 
the House of Lords or the famous Borax181 cases decided by German courts in the 1960´s, 
where foreign public policy was found to be applicable with the result, that recognition of the 
awards was refused.  
French Courts have follow a similar approach when they state: “If French judges are not 
called upon to sanction in French courts this violations committed abroad against the public 
policy of a given State, nevertheless, they must consider as illegal and therefore devoid of 
validity smuggling operations which, as they violate foreign laws, do infringe as in the present 
case international public policy (…)”182. 
                                                
180 England 1958 A.C: 301 [1957] 3 All E.R. 286 J 1961. 1140 
The case was about an international contract between two businessman domiciled in Switzerland and 
England- a contract perfectly legal with regard to the  English proper law, was considered null and void 
according to Indian law which prohibited the trade of jute with South Africa, following the apartheid 
measures imposed on Indians. 
181 BGH 27 XII 1960, BGHZ 34, 169, NJW 1961 page 822; BGH 24 V 1962 NJW 1962 Page 1436  
In the first case, the plaintiff, a reseller, had been unable to obtain from its own Danish Buyer a 
declaration of non-export and, for that reason, the German defendant has been unable to obtain 
delivery in the US and had been sued for damages as a result of the breach of contract. In the second 
analogous case, the buyer purchased Borax from the US in order to re-export it to Poland, and the 
dispute related to the validity of the insurance contract for maritime transport. In both Cases the BGH 
held that the contracts were null and void, since the violation of the American embargo was against 
good morals and so was the fraudent behaviour of the parties. It is noteworthy, that these German 
decisions take into consideration a foreign public policy or but also national interests, when they state, 
that their decision is based on the absence of damage to the German economy and first and foremost 
the interest of the whole of the Western free world and, therefore, on the very interests of the Federal 
Republic. 
182 ICCA Para 84 
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The English Court of Appeal has held in Soleimany vs. Soleimany183 (1998), that 
enforcement of an award giving effect to a contract between father and son, which required 
the smuggling of carpets out of Iran, would be contrary to English public policy. 
Among the various commentators the situation appears different to the actual practice of the 
courts. They see the English practice as exceptional and state, that it is almost universally 
accepted, that it is only the forums public policy that is relevant184. 
This question is insofar interesting as the application of a foreign public policy by the 
exequatur court constitutes an extraterritorial application of the foreign law. A state judge 
cannot, within the context of his own national private international law, go beyond the 
classical national concept of the states international public policy, unless he is called upon to 
respect rules or principles which are based on an international consensus which is, if not 
universal, at least sufficiently widespread. If the judge would apply foreign public policy rules 
directly, he would violate the concept of the territorial autonomy of the lex fori  state. 
There is said to be a tendency, according to which foreign public policy is applied where the 
following three conditions are simultaneously are realized185:  
(a) that the contract has a sufficient connection with the foreign State the law of which 
has been violated 
(b) that such foreign law has a mandatory or imperative character and insists on being 
applied, according to its own criteria 
(c) that such foreign law aims at protecting interests which are not purely selfish but 
appear worthy of protection in a supranational perspective. 
This tendency is insofar noteworthy, as it promotes uniform decisions on an international 
level (internationaler entscheidungseinklang). Therefore it might be concluded, that it is not 
possible to answer the question whose public policy is applied in general. It will always 
depend on the circumstances of the case and the states involved.   
 
5.2. The scope of Public policy 
5.2.1. General 
183 England Court of Appeal, Soleimany vs. Soleimany 1998 
184 ILA Page 242 
185 ICCA Para 86 
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As already mentioned briefly above, an important aspect of public policy is to what extend 
public policy is investigated by the enforcement court. A too narrow investigation might result 
in not enough public policy violations to be found, a too wide investigation might violate the 
finality of the award and will result in an anti enforcement policy. 
Generally there is no reason to go into the issues again. For example the Paris Court of 
Appeal has held:  
“The scrutiny of the Court (…) must bear not upon the evaluation made by the arbitrators 
with regard to the cited requirements of public policy, but on the solution given to the dispute, 
annulment only being incurred if enforcement of that solution violates the aforementioned 
public policy. The court may act ex officio in examining public policy.”186
However material justice might require investigating the award. French and German courts: 
therefore have developed a theory of the so called “mitigated effect of public policy”. By this 
theory a distinction is made between the reaction of the public policy to the effects in France 
of a right already acquired abroad, and the reaction of public policy to the acquisition of a 
right in France. In the first case, the demands of public policy may be dismissed or 
attenuated, whereas in the second case, they apply with their full vigour. In other words: The 
stronger the impact/consequence of the award is in the country of enforcement, the stricter 
the public policy exception187.  
To give an example: where a foreign award demands payment of a certain amount for 
damages from an undertaking that has not other connection to the enforcement state than its 
bank accounts, the public policy bar will be likely to be at a low level. The situation might be 
different, where a party is required to perform certain parts of a contract when the 
undertaking is closely connected with the enforcement state. 
It would be possible to argue, that this is a public policy that favours the nationals of a certain 
state. The enforcement state has a special duty to protect those undertakings that have a 
close relation to the state, which is why there is a public policy exception  
However the real question is, if it would be better for international commerce to apply the 
same strict bar of public policy on all cases involved?..  
 
5.2.2. Substantive Public policy 
186 France: Paris Court of Appeal, Lebanese Traders, Distributers&Consultants vs. Reynolds 27 
October 1994 (1994) Rev. Arb. 709 citied from ILA  243  
187 ILA 228 
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Generally the Court will not need to look further than the award itself. Only when there are 
issues that have not being dealt with properly in the course of arbitration or litigation, the 
enforcement court will need re-open the facts. Where the award fails to investigate important 
matters the enforcement court will start investigation on its on motion. Where the award 
giving arbitrator/court deals with and investigates the question of concern, the enforcement 
court will most likely trust in the competence of the arbitrator/court and will not go into the 
issues again.188
5.2.3. Procedural Public policy 
Regarding the scope of public policy, the ILA states: “Where a party bases its objection to 
recognition or enforcement on procedural public policy the court may need to carry out a 
wider enquiry”189. As to the extent of review by the courts (…), the enforcement court may be 
reluctant to consider arguments that were available at the time of the hearing and or could 
have been presented to the supervisory court in an application to have the award set 
aside”190  
Since this is all about Procedural public policy, the ILA report appears to be too strict. It 
cannot be that it is on the party to point out and proof procedural public policy violations. This 
would be a contradiction to the meaning of public policy as an instrument safeguarding 
certain procedural principles, which are so essential to the state, that they have to be 
protected by all means. 
Therefore it might be concluded, that it will all depend on the nature of the procedural 
injustice, previous investigation of the matter by a supervisory court or (controversial) if the 
party has waived its right by not taking action against the procedural violation. 
 
5.3. Waiver 
Another question is, if the public policy exception can be waived ex ante in total or partly.  
188 France: Paris Court of Appeal European Gas Turbines SA vs. Westman International Ltd., decision 
dated 30 September 1993 reported in (1995) Yearbook 198  
Eco Swiss China Time vs. Benetton NV 1.june.1999, C126/97 [1999] 2 all ER (Comm) 44  
England: Westacre Investments Inc. vs. Jugoimport SDPR Holding Co. Ltd. [1999] 2 Lloyd `s Report 
65 
189 ILA Page 245 
190 Ibid 237 
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Bearing in mind, that a party cannot waive its rights to appeal for review or resist 
enforcement before the reasoned award has been submitted to the parties in some 
legislations, i.e. Germany and French Law, the question arises, whether the public policy 
exception is to the disposition of the parties at all. 
The very nature of public policy as an instrument of the state to control essential notions and 
morals of its legal system, which also consists of mandatory rules, is not compatible with a 
public policy exception subject to the disposition of the parties in general191. In short, the 
public policy compatibility is checked on the courts own motion (ex officio).  
However a waiver of public policy violations by the parties it might need to be interpreted. 
Especially in the field of procedural rules in arbitration, the duty to give procedural rules is 
mainly on the parties. The parties can agree upon certain procedural rules, because it is part 
of the autonomy of their will, as described above. Nonetheless they are not free to abolish 
certain procedural rules which warrant the procedural public policy principles since these 
principles are essential elements of public policy, unless they want to risk their award being 
unenforceable. The autonomy of the will of the parties is not without limits. This is without 
doubt true in cases of international substantial public policy. The parties cannot enforce 
contracts i.e. dealing with issues contrary to good morals (such as slavery). It would be 
inconsistent to argue, that the parties can enforce awards which are contrary to procedural 
public policy. Procedural public policy protects principles that are not less important as 
substantial public policy provisions. These procedural principles ensure, that justice is not 
only done, but seen to be done.  
It would therefore be possible to conclude, that the autonomy of the parties will finds its 
borders in the rules of international public policy, and the parties cannot successfully waive 
expressively or implied the public policy control192.  
However, courts might be willing to take a waiver of public policy in consideration where the 
violation of public policy has occurred, and interpret it among the very circumstances of the 
case.       
 
CHAPTER 6. Conclusion 
                                                
191 Beck, C.H. Practitioner`s Handbook on International Arbitration, 2002, Page 525 
192 Of other opinion with further references see: Ylva Axelsen, Public Policy as a Bar to Recognition 
and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 2004, Masterthesis at the School for Advanced 
Legal Studies, University of Cape Town  
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After having described the very nature and content of international public policy, the question 
raised in the beginning remains to be answered succinctly: Is the concept a public policy 
exception a curse or a blessing to international commercial awards? 
It is a question which should not be answered simplistically with a yes or a no, especially 
after we have seen the diverse applications and contents of public policy.  
From the perspective of the promoters of international trade and uniform laws, the 
international public policy exception might appear to be what an English Judge, in 1824 
described as: 
“a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. 
It may lead you from sound of law. It is never argued, but when other points fail.”193
It has also been argued194 that the states like to dress their jockeys in the colour of their 
nations, meaning that nationals are more likely to profit from the public policy exception than 
foreigners. 
However this point of view cannot be confirmed by the decisions which were dealt with in this 
thesis. The aforementioned phenomenon that there are a number of decisions in favour of 
the national parties, can be easily explained theoretically. A losing party cannot enforce an 
award. The winning party might need to enforce the award, where the losing party fails to pay 
on its own accord. The place where enforcement is sought is the state where the losing party 
has its assets. Normally, the party not only has assets in the state, but is connected closer 
with the state by other means, i.e. by domicile or nationality. The state then checks if the 
award seeking enforcement meets the public policy requirements and, where it does not, it 
rejects enforcement on the grounds of public policy. 
Since there are only awards seeking enforcement against the party which has its domicile 
and nationality in this particular state, they are the only awards to be refused on grounds of 
public policy. Only in cases where the court is unsure whether the public policy rule is 
violated or not, the court might stress the public policy principle and come to the conclusion 
that it is not violated, that is why there seems to be a biased public policy. 
From the perspective of the enforcement state, the public policy exception constitutes a 
necessary instrument to warrant the state`s sovereignty and the autonomy of its legal system 
and represents a means to safe guard the most important notions of its legal system, even in 
193 Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 228; [1824-34] ALL ER Rep. 258 
194 Ylva Axelsen, Public Policy as a Bar to Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards, 2004, Masterthesis at the School for Advanced Legal Studies, University of Cape Town 
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cross-border disputes.  
From the perspective of the winning party, the public policy exception might constitute the 
unforseeable risk being unable to enforce an award after time-consuming, and expensive, 
litigation or arbitration processes. Bearing in mind that the notions of public policy are flexible 
and apt to change in terms of content and application over time, the fear of the winning party 
is reasonable. On the other side, the public policy exception exists for quite some time 
already, and has become more predictable by steady application by the courts, but leaving 
some risk open.  
From the perspective of the losing party, the public policy exception appears to be the last 
bar to stop enforcement. The losing party should not rely upon the public policy exception 
since it is rarely applied. 
Finally we should examine the perspective of the arbitrators. An arbitrator has the duty not 
only to render a fair award but also to render a valid and enforceable award. That is what the 
parties involved in the arbtration expect from the arbitrator. An arbitrator, even a very 
experienced one, cannot know every public policy provision of the countries possibly 
involved or even those worldwide. In practice, this will be recognized as a heavy burden for 
the arbitrator, having to deal with the “unpredictable” phenomenon of the public policy 
exception. 
The only solution to this problem, for the arbitrator, is to render the award cautiously, 
investigate all the issues in dispute and warrant internationally recognised standards of due 
process, to be sure to meet the public policy requirements of the majority of states. This 
ensures that international arbitral awards are of high quality and involve fair reasoning. Due 
to the very nature of the arbitral process, a process without a second instance, this 
constitutes a nessesary control of the arbitral awards. Consequently, it would be possible to 
argue that the public policy exception, by forcing arbitrators to apply high standards to their 
awards, safeguards the international recognition of international commercial arbitral awards 
while promoting international arbitration. In other words: from an arbitrators point of view, the 
international public policy exception represents the necessary control of certain standards 
needed in international arbitration. 
However, it is obvious that the present situation of diverse worldwide notions of public policy 
cannot be said to be the best possible one. The International Law Association 
Recommendations on the Application of Public Policy as a Ground for Refusing Recognition 
or Enforcement of Internaitonal Arbitral Awards (2002) provides a useful guidance to national 
enforcement court judges. 
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In short, these recommendations provide the following195: 
(a) the pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention calls for a narrow concept of 
public policy; 
(b) Article 5 II NYC addresses international, not domestic public policy, which is primarily 
limited to fundamental principles pertaining to justice and morality and rules designed 
to serve the essential social, economic or political interest of a state; 
(c) Article 5 II NYC speaks of international public policy of the enforcement state, with the 
consequence that the source of international public policy is a national one, unless a 
consensus emerges among states, in which case one generally speaks of 
transnational public policy; 
(d) When a party could have relied upon a public policy objection in the arbtiration, but 
did not, it is barred from raising such objection at the enforcement stage. (note: this 
only applies to Article 5 I NYC)  
Finally, the question raised in the title, whether the public policy constitutes a curse or a 
blessing to the enforcement of international commercial awards, can be answered: The 
international public policy exception is neither good nor bad, but simply necessary in the 
process of enforcement of international commercial awards. 
195 Albert Jan van den Berg, International Arbitration Congress (17th : 2004 : Beijing, China) New 
horizons in international commercial arbitration and beyond / general editor: Albert Jan van den The 
Hague : Kluwer Law International, c2005. 2005 DH 341.522 NEW Page 288 
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